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 UNREASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND DUE HARDSHIP  
Mark C. Weber*  
Abstract 
 
This Article analyzes authoritative sources concerning the Americans 
with Disabilities Act accommodation requirement and concludes: 
(1) Reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are two sides of the 
same coin. The statutory duty is accommodation up to the limit of 
hardship, and reasonable accommodation should not be a separate hurdle 
for claimants to surmount apart from the undue hardship defense. There is 
no such thing as “unreasonable accommodation” or “due hardship.” 
(2) The duty to accommodate is a substantial obligation, one that may 
be expensive to satisfy, and one that is not subject to a cost-benefit balance 
but rather a cost-resource balance; it is also subject to increase over time. 
(3) The accommodation duty entails mandatory departure from neutral 
workplace rules, effectively creating a preference for workers with 
disabilities, but one not to be confused with the affirmative action concept 
found in other anti-discrimination regimes.  
These conclusions are in some respects consistent with, and in other 
respects inconsistent with, leading judicial interpretations, including the 
single Supreme Court case on accommodations in employment, US 
Airways v. Barnett. This Article will suggest avenues by which courts may 
be led back to the correct interpretation of reasonable accommodation by 
looking to the text of the statute and its legislative history, interpretations 
by the enforcing agency, judicial construction of analogous language 
elsewhere in the ADA, and precedent from other jurisdictions. 
For twenty years, judicial and scholarly attention focused on who is a 
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person with a disability entitled to the protections of the ADA. Narrow 
readings of coverage kept many cases with accommodations claims from 
reaching a decision on the merits. Recently, Congress enacted the ADA 
Amendments Act, vastly expanding the range of covered individuals. After 
the Amendments, attention will turn to what accommodations employers 
must provide. This Article is the first to return to the original sources to 
determine what Congress required and to analyze both Barnett and the 
lower court cases in light of that understanding. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act requires an employer to make 
“reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations 
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability” unless the employer 
demonstrates “that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship 
on the operation of the business of such covered entity.”1 This 
accommodation duty is the defining characteristic of modern disability 
discrimination statutes,2 and the key term distinguishing those enactments 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2006). This Article focuses on the employment Title of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, Title I, §§ 12111–12117. Hence, the terms “covered entity” and 
“employer” will generally be interchangeable. See id. § 12111(2). Other titles cover state and local 
government (Title II), privately-owned public accommodations (Title III), telecommunications 
(Title IV), and general matters, such as retaliation and attorneys’ fees (Title V). In this Article, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act will be referred to as the “ADA” or the “Act.” 
 2. Comparative law sources stress the importance of the accommodation obligation in 
making disability discrimination statutes into effective means to integrate people with disabilities 
into the workplace. See, e.g., Lisa Waddington, When It Is Reasonable for Europeans to be 
Confused: Understanding When a Disability Is “Reasonable” from a Comparative Perspective, 29 
COMP. LAB. L. &  POL’Y J. 317, 317–18 (2008). Many authorities describe the ADA’s 
accommodation obligation as crucial. See, e.g., SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1 (2009) (“Importantly, the statute takes the 
concept of forbidden discrimination beyond intentional and overt exclusion; it also treats as 
3
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from laws that forbid race and sex discrimination.3 If the ADA is the 
“emancipation proclamation for people with disabilities,”4 the 
accommodations requirement is the Thirteenth Amendment: the 
enforceable duty that requires changes in the way things have always been 
done in order to permit people with disabilities to integrate into society on 
a plane equal to that of others.5 
Nonetheless, the interpretation of the ADA’s accommodations 
requirement remains severely underdeveloped.6 For twenty years, judicial 
and scholarly attention focused on who is a person with a disability entitled 
to the protections of the law.7 Narrow readings of coverage provisions kept 
                                                                                                                     
discrimination the failure to provide ‘reasonable accommodations’ to people with disabilities.”).  
 3. Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable 
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1996) (“[Failure to provide reasonable accommodation] is a far 
different definition of ‘discrimination’ than the definition embraced in other areas of employment 
discrimination law. Title VII, for instance, essentially takes jobs as it finds them. It defines 
discrimination in a negative sense: employment practices are unlawful only if they prevent 
individuals from doing the job as the employer defines it.”). Some prominent sources take issue 
with this proposition, but their response is less that the accommodations requirement is 
conceptually unique than that traditional anti-discrimination provisions also impose economic 
inefficiencies on employers by doing such things as forbidding hiring and firing on the basis of 
consumer and co-worker preferences. SeeSamuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” 
Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 859–70 (2003) 
(tracing normative ramifications); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 642, 684–95 (2001) (developing general position); Michael Ashley Stein, Same 
Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
579, 616–22 (2004) (tracing economic ramifications). Even those who take broader positions 
linking reasonable accommodation with other anti-discrimination mandates note that disability 
discrimination law’s reasonable accommodation provision entails differences in interpretation from 
other statutes. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the 
Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 865 (2004). None of the sources contests the 
importance of a strong accommodation duty in the ADA for achieving functional equality for 
persons with disabilities. 
 4. 136 CONG. REC. 21,923 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin). 
 5. See Cass R. Sunstein, Caste and Disability: The Moral Foundations of the ADA, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 101 (2008) (describing reasonable accommodation duty in ADA as “the 
clearest reflection, in American law, of an anticaste principle—a principle that raises questions 
about social and legal practices that turn a morally irrelevant difference into a systematic source of 
social disadvantage”) (footnotes omitted). 
 6. Witness the aptly titled article, John E. Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, What Is 
Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA? Not an Easy Answer; Rather a Plethora of 
Questions, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 67 (2009). Holdings on reasonable accommodation and undue 
hardship are contradictory and often poorly reasoned. S e infra Part II (describing accommodations 
case law). 
 7. A vast number of sources collect, analyze, and criticize the even more vast case law on 
this topic. Among the more prominent articles are: Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost 
Readings of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992 (2008); Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397 (2000); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., 
“Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model 
and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL . L. REV. 409 (1997); Chai R. 
Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under the Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? 
4
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many cases with accommodations claims from reaching decision on the 
merits.8 Ultimately, Congress enacted a new statute—the ADA 
Amendments Act (ADAAA)—designed to end the coverage controversy 
by disapproving two Supreme Court decisions and vastly expanding the 
range of covered individuals.9 After the ADAAA, attention will turn to 
what accommodations employers must provide in order to comply with the 
Act.10 
                                                                                                                     
Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &  LAB. L. 91 (2000); Ann Hubbard, 
The Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217 (2004); Jane Byeff Korn, 
Cancer and the ADA: Rethinking Disability, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (2001). 
 8. See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can 
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 307, 358 (2001) (“By constricting the meaning of ‘disability’ to such an extent, the Court has 
blocked at the gate the vast majority of claims that would otherwise proceed to trial or settlement.”); 
Ani B. Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction: On the Role of “Normal Species Functioning” in 
Disability Analysis, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &  ETHICS 221, 247 n.107 (2006) (“To date, the 
Supreme Court has so narrowly construed the disability threshold test that few cases have made it 
through to reasonable accommodation analysis. Further, since the Court groups the inquiry of 
whether someone is disabled with whether they are entitled to a remedy, analysis surrounding 
whether accommodations should be made, and if so, what they should be, is often muddled with 
disability eligibility questions, making it difficult to determine how courts approach reasonable 
accommodation.”); see also Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with 
Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 
228–29 (2008), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/44 
(“[Before the 2008 Amendments, by] adopting a strict definition of disability, courts were able to 
avoid dealing with accommodation issues that, due to their fact-specific nature, were not easily 
decided on a motion for summary judgment and that had the potential to place significant burdens 
on employers. Regardless of the reason, the end result has been a marked lack of clear rules on the 
subject of reasonable accommodation.”); Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental 
Illness, Employment Discrimination, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 GEO. MASON U. 
CIV . RTS. L.J. 79, 124–25 (2006) (“By halting . . . claims [of persons with personality disorders] at 
the claim’s definitional stage—where the plaintiff is essentially ‘classified’ for statutory purposes—
courts evade the more complex issue of how society must, if at all, accommodate those whose 
personalities it has labeled as disordered.”). 
 9. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). See generally Long, supra note 8 (describing 
expansion of coverage and other provisions in ADAAA). Congress disapproved Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that impairments must be evaluated in their 
mitigated state in determining if complainant is individual with disability), and Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (holding that terms of 
disability definition are to be strictly construed), § 2(b)(2)–(5); provided that impairments are to be 
evaluated in a state not mitigated by medication, appliances, or bodily systems (except, in general, 
ordinary eyeglasses), § 3(4)(E); provided that major life activities whose substantial impairment 
triggers coverage include major internal bodily systems and functions, § 3(2); established that 
persons covered by virtue of being regarded as having an impairment need not be perceived to have 
an impairment that limits a major life activity, § 3(3); and made additional changes. 
 10. See Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 
WASH. L. REV. 513, 540 (2008) (“[B]y including greater numbers of individuals in the protected 
class, the [AD]AAA will likely focus more attention on whether accommodations impose an ‘undue 
hardship’ on an employer.”). Some view this shift of focus with alarm. Professor Michelle Travis 
writes, “In fact, if the ADAAA succeeds in its primary objective of shifting litigation focus away 
5
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This Article analyzes authoritative sources concerning the 
accommodation requirement’s intended meaning and concludes: (1) 
Reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are two sides of the same 
coin. The statutory duty is one of accommodation up to the limit of 
hardship, and reasonable accommodation should not be a separate hurdle 
for claimants to surmount apart from the undue hardship defense offered 
employers. The title of this Article notwithstanding, there is no such thing 
as “unreasonable accommodation” or “due hardship.” (2) The duty to 
accommodate is a significant burden, one that may be expensive to satisfy, 
and one that is subject not to a cost-benefit balance but instead to a cost-
resources balance that varies with the capacities of the employer; it is also 
a dynamic obligation liable to increase over time. (3) The accommodation 
duty entails mandatory departure from neutral workplace rules, effectively 
creating a preference for workers with disabilities, but one not to be 
confused with the affirmative action concept found in other anti-
discrimination regimes.  
These conclusions are in some respects consistent with, and in other 
respects inconsistent with, leading judicial interpretations of the 
accommodations term, including the single Supreme Court case on 
accommodations in employment, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.11 The 
Article will suggest avenues by which courts may be led back to the correct 
interpretation of reasonable accommodation by looking to the text of the 
statute and its legislative history, interpretation by the federal agency 
charged with the ADA’s enforcement, judicial constructions of analogous 
language elsewhere in the ADA, and precedent regarding comparable 
enactments from other jurisdictions. 
Significant scholarship exists on the subject of reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship,12 but this Article is the first to return 
                                                                                                                     
from scrutinizing whether an individual is or is not disabled, and toward the issue of whether 
employers have fulfilled their reasonable accommodation obligations, the ADAAA actually may 
reinvigorate the backlash as the accommodation mandate becomes more visible and more 
contested.” Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 320 (2009). 
 11. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 12. In addition to sources cited and discussed later in this article, notable scholarship on 
accommodations includes: Cheryl L. Anderson, What Is “Because of the Disability” Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the Windfall 
Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. &  LAB. L. 323 (2006) (focusing on how courts use “because of the 
disability” language to impose unwarranted causation standards in reasonable accommodation 
claims); Seth D. Harris, Re-Thinking the Economics of Discrimination: U.S. Airways v. Barnett, he 
ADA, and the Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 123 (2003) (arguing 
that “the employer/defendant and the employee/plaintiff with a disability should share a 
responsibility to offer the best available economic analysis of the employer’s seniority system so 
that the reviewing court may assess the consequences of a proposed accommodation that might 
violate the seniority system”); James Leonard, The Equity Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil 
Rights Concepts Has Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (2005) 
(arguing that Congress and courts erred in basing workplace disability policy on traditional civil 
rights principles); Helen A. Schartz et al., Workplace Accommodations: Empirical Study of Current 
6
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to the original sources to determine what Congress meant and to analyze 
both Barnett and the lower court cases in light of that understanding. This 
Article contributes to the scholarly debate by suggesting a revised 
understanding of accommodation—that accommodation and hardship are 
the same concept, that the burden is significant and subject to grow over 
time, and that neutral rules are not sacrosanct—supported by the language 
and legislative history of the ADA, as well as cases interpreting other parts 
of the ADA and interpretations of other similar enactments. 
Part I of this Article discusses Congress’s original meaning for the 
reasonable accommodation-undue hardship provision and draws the 
conclusions about the provision that are outlined above. To do so, Part I 
discusses methods of statutory interpretation, then the text, legislative 
history, enforcing agency interpretations, and social context of the ADA. 
Part II considers judicial interpretations of the term, both at the lower court 
and Supreme Court level. Part III discusses correcting the courts’ 
interpretation of the accommodations requirement by returning to original 
sources, drawing on available but untapped precedent, and letting lay triers 
of fact take the primary role in determining the propriety of 
accommodations.  
I.  THE MEANING OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE 
HARDSHIP 
To determine the correct meaning of the reasonable accommodation 
duty and its undue hardship limit, it is necessary to examine leading 
theories of statutory interpretation. The most sensible approach to 
interpretation calls for analyzing the language of the statute, the legislative 
history, the interpretation of the agency charged with enforcing the law, 
and the social context in which the law was passed. From that raw 
material, it is possible to fashion a clear meaning for the ADA’s 
accommodation term. 
A.  Approaches to Statutory Interpretation 
There are two leading theories about interpreting statutes: 
intentionalism and textualism.13 Intentionalism, sometimes labeled 
                                                                                                                     
Employees, 75 MISS. L.J. 917 (2006) (providing empirical data to understand underlying factors of 
employers’ accommodation decisions). 
 13. Some approaches attempt to bridge the main ones. For example, Professor Bernard Bell 
suggests a “public justification” method, which would look only to text of a law and a limited 
category of institutional statements justifying the law, such as committee reports and committee 
chairs’ comments. Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public 
Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8 (1999). This approach 
permits reference to the legislative materials relied on here in connection with interpreting the 
ADA. Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey suggest an approach based on practical 
reasoning that draws from the theories behind textualism and contrasting approaches. William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
321 (1990). Their approach also countenances the use of legislative history in appropriate 
circumstances. See id. at 356 (“In accordance with the Court’s practice, our practical reasoning 
7
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purposivism,14 interprets statutes so as to accomplish what the enacting 
legislature wanted to do. When there are ambiguities in text, intentionalists 
look primarily to authoritative legislative history, such as committee 
reports and the statements of legislators taking a leadership role in the 
passage of a statute.15 Intentionalists argue that the courts should act as 
agents of the legislature and that, to be a faithful agent, it sometimes is 
necessary to look beyond the words of a command for the underlying goals 
of the principal.16 
Textualists respond that the legislature as a whole is the principal and 
that it enacts only the text of the statute, not any supporting or explanatory 
materials.17 Many view reliance on texts other than those that made it into 
law as improper avoidance of the legislative machinery established by the 
Constitution.18 Some even challenge the idea that a corporate body has 
anything that be called an intent,19 while others note that the legislative 
process involves compromises among conflicting purposes, making the 
statements of proponents unreliable as a guide to the purposes of the 
whole.20 Textualists view discoveries of the enactors’ underlying intentions 
                                                                                                                     
model also considers the original expectations of the Congress that enacted the statute. . . . The most 
authoritative historical evidence is the legislative history of the statute . . . .”). A few authorities 
seem to reject all approaches. For example, Professor Michael Selmi finds neither textualism nor 
intentionalism satisfactory with regard to interpreting the definition of disability found in the ADA; 
he also rejects a “positive political theory” approach, which relies on judicial ideas about the 
preferences of the current, rather than the enacting, Congress. Michael Selmi, Int rpreting the 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress 
Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 566–67 (2008).  
 14. It is possible to draw a distinction between intentionalism and purposivism, but the 
present discussion does not require it. Cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 13, at 325–40 (drawing 
distinction); Joel Schellhammer, Recent Case, D fining the Court’s Role as Faithful Agent in 
Statutory Interpretation: Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005), 
29 HARV. J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y 1119, 1126–29 (2006) (distinguishing “classical interpretivism,” 
textualism and “modern purposivism”). 
 15. This includes drafters and floor managers. See George A. Costello, Average Voting 
Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor 
Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 41–42; see also Jonathan 
Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 
1515–16 (2000) (describing Justice Stevens’s position on use of legislative history). 
 16. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a 
Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1313 (1990). 
 17. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
15–16 (2001). 
 18. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 
17 HARV. J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y 61, 63 (1994); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 696–99 (1997) (describing conventional textualist position); id. 
at 706–37 (describing author’s preferred variation on conventional position). 
 19. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) 
(“Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’ hidden yet 
discoverable.”). 
 20. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the 
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1984) (“If statutes are bargains among special interests, 
8
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as thinly veiled preferences of the interpreters themselves.21 When 
confronted with ambiguous statutory text, they favor use of canons of 
construction, structure and relationship arguments, even dictionaries.22  
A strict textualist approach has many flaws. Its skepticism of the 
concept of intent is at odds with textualism’s own use of methods such as 
looking to the meaning of the same words in other statutes and reliance on 
the enactment’s structure—methods that assume that the legislature 
intended at least something that can be discerned by interpretation.23 Even 
if congressional intent is a legal construct, it is hardly different from the 
intent of corporations or government agencies. Courts routinely rely upon 
the intent of corporations and government agencies in deciding cases.24 
And the textualist approach exalts the power of the judiciary by permitting 
it to reach results that the legislature, if it has anything that can be called 
intent at all, would not want.25 Among the various places to look for the 
                                                                                                                     
they should be enforced like contracts. . . . Thus the Court will . . . reject efforts by consumers to 
use litigation to ‘improve’ the operation of statutes that were not designed to help consumers in the 
first place.”). 
 21. See Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 63 (“Having a wide field to play—not only the statute 
but also the debates, not only the rules but also the values they advance, and so on—liberates 
judges. This is objectionable on grounds of democratic theory as well as on grounds of 
predictability.”). Textualists fear that isolated statements in legislative background material, perhaps 
intentionally planted by congressional staffers and unread by most representatives voting for a 
measure, will mislead a court interpreting the statute. See Manning, supra note 18, at 686–89 
(presenting conventional view); id. at 731–37 (presenting somewhat more nuanced view). 
 22. See ANTONIN SCALIA , A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23–
29 (1997). 
 23. Zeppos, supra note 16, at 1319; see also Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public 
Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 456 
(2005) (“Take, for example, the rule of construction that statutory words are to be given their 
‘ordinary meaning.’ What is the rationale for this rule? It is based on the assumption that legislative 
drafters are most likely to use words that way. If a court adopts that assumption, it will be more 
likely to make a decision that is loyal to the legislature’s intention.”) (footnote omitted). 
 24. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504 (1993) (discussing proof of 
intent of corporate employer in context of employment discrimination claim). See generally Solan, 
supra note 23, at 428 (“We routinely attribute intent to a group of people based on the intent of a 
subset of that group, provided that there is agreement in advance about what role the subgroup will 
play. The legislature is a prototypical example of the kind of group to which this process applies 
most naturally.”). 
 25. Zeppos, supra note 16, at 1314 (“The tension between textualist theory and representative 
government is obvious. The textualist focusing on statutory text openly accepts, and indeed 
mandates, arrival at a result that may often be inconsistent with any notion of what the legislature 
actually intended.”); see Solan, supra note 23, at 431–32 (“[N]ot taking this sort of information into 
account increases the likelihood of a court’s accepting an interpretation that is absurdly at odds with 
the intentions of the enacting legislature.”). Textualism’s methods for resolving the inevitable 
ambiguities in statutory language are no better a solution for dealing with unknown compromises 
among representatives or hidden motivations behind votes than any other interpretive method. 
Zeppos, supra note 16, at 1322. Both strict textualist interpretation and intentionalist methods, such 
as reliance on legislative history, are subject to manipulation in support of the result the interpreter 
favors. Id. at 1323 (“Statutory language has no single or objective meaning. It, like legislative 
history, is subject to ‘manipulation’ (or, perhaps more accurately, interpretation). The textualist’s 
9
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meaning of unclear statutory terms, legislative history is a far more natural 
choice than the enigmatic and contradictory canons of statutory 
construction or definitions drawn from arbitrarily chosen dictionaries.26 
Legislators rely on party leaders and congressional subject matter experts 
whose ideas are reflected in committee reports and other basic legislative 
history materials, so looking to these sources makes sense.27 
Despite all the conflicting views about interpretation, there is currently 
some convergence among textualists and intentionalists in looking first to 
text and then making cautious use of background materials; accordingly, 
the textualist-intentionalist divide may be overstated.28 A limited use of 
                                                                                                                     
claim that he alone is loyal to the true meaning of the text, while others are engaged in manipulation 
or result-oriented judging, involves no small amount of hubris.”) (footnote omitted); s e also 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 
87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 595–96 (2002) (“[S]trict textualism wraps judicial discretion in the guise 
of ‘just’ reading the text. Hence, it allows judges to make policy choices sub rosa, without either the 
cognitively valuable exercise of justification or the restraining mindset of a faithful agent seeking to 
implement the goals of the legislative principal.”). 
 26. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 845, 869–72 (1992) (noting conflicting nature of canons of construction, absence of 
justification for some of them, and failure of canons to meet expectations of, or provide guidance to, 
legislators or those affected by legislation); see also Zeppos, supra note 16, at 1331 (“The textualist 
is correct that legislative history does not pass through the article I procedures for making law, but 
as its name [connotes], legislative history is nonetheless a product of the legislature. Through 
judicial resort to legislative history, Congress and its members have been able to exert continuing 
influence over policymaking decisions that arise after the enactment of the statute.”). Many years 
ago, Professor Karl Llewellyn pointed out that conflicting canons of construction exist on almost 
every question. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950). For a 
collection of criticism and support of Llewellyn on this issue, see Frank B. Cross, The Significance 
of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 1978 (2007). 
 27. See Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276–77 (1996) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“Legislators, like other busy people, often depend on the judgment of 
trusted colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities. If a statute . . . has bipartisan 
support and has been carefully considered by committees familiar with the subject matter, 
Representatives and Senators may appropriately rely on the views of the committee members in 
casting their votes. . . . [S]ince most Members are content to endorse the views of the responsible 
committees, the intent of those involved in the drafting process is properly regarded as the intent of 
the entire Congress.”); Solan, supra note 23, at 449 (“It may be true that many who voted for a bill 
did so because the party leadership told them to, or because the bill contained some benefit for 
people in their district, or for some other reason having nothing to do with what the bill’s authors 
and planners had in mind. Nonetheless, the bill’s planners gave it content. When disputes arise, it 
would be odd for a member who voted for the bill without knowing what was in it to complain that 
the court was looking at the details of the planning process . . . .”); see also Breyer, supra note 26, 
at 859–60 (noting that top officials of most large institutions rely on staff to write documents that 
are fairly viewed as true reflections of institutional positions); cf. id. at 855–56 (discussing 
examples of statements of floor leaders reflecting purposes of various interests and constituencies 
on complex bankruptcy legislation). 
 28. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2006); 
id. at 38 (“[V]irtually all interpreters today—both self-proclaimed textualists and purposivists—
tend to exclude legislative history if the text, in context, otherwise is clear.”); Caleb Nelson, What Is 
10
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legislative history, one that relies on committee reports and focuses on 
matters that the drafters of the reports viewed with consensus, is an 
intentionalist method that sparks the least resistance from the textualists.29 
Moreover, both intentionalists and textualists defer to the interpretive 
regulations of the administrative entity charged by the legislature with 
enforcing the statute.30 Employing a restrained use of intentionalist 
technique, this Article will examine legislative text, authoritative 
legislative history, the terms of enforcing agency regulations, and historical 
context in discussing the meaning of the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship language.  
B.  The Statutory Text 
The ADA requires “making reasonable accommodations to the known 
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on 
the operation of the business of such covered entity.”31 The ADA does not 
                                                                                                                     
Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 348 (2005) (“[N]o ‘textualist’ favors isolating statutory language 
from its surrounding context, and no critic of textualism believes that statutory text is 
unimportant.”) (footnotes omitted). Contemporary textualists do not resist the call to look at the 
broad historical context of a statute to give meaning to the text. S e Molot, supra, at 35 (“[M]odern 
textualists may criticize strong purposivism for giving too much weight to context, and for 
emphasizing certain kinds of context (legislative history) that textualists think should be off limits, 
but modern textualists do not, in principle, object to the notion that judges should look to context as 
well as text.”) (collecting sources). As Molot notes, even “textualists will sometimes use legislative 
history to gain a background understanding of the problems Congress was trying to address.” I . at 
39 (collecting sources). 
 29. See Molot, supra note 28, at 3–4 (“[S]ome textualists will look to legislative history not 
to glean the intent of a statute’s authors, but rather for the more modest purpose of providing a 
background understanding of the problems Congress was trying to address. . . . The legislative 
history question remains open, but it no longer is important enough to warrant the attention that it 
has received in the past. It certainly is not important enough to sustain a full-blown scholarly 
debate.”); see also Bell, supra note 13, at 84–88 (defending use of selected legislative history, 
relying on arguments drawn from textualist ideas). But see John F. Manning, What Divides 
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 91 (2006) (distinguishing textualists’ 
reliance on “semantic context” from purposivists’ reliance on “policy context”). 
 30. Thus, both judges associated with textualism and those associated with intentionalism 
endorse the rule of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), regarding deferral to administrative agencies charged by Congress with the administration 
of a statute. Chevron states that a court is required to ask whether Congress has “directly spoken to 
the precise question” and must follow clear congressional intent. Id. at 842. If the statute is 
“ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006). The statutory provision has a subsection (B), which 
further defines forbidden discrimination to include “denying employment opportunities to a job 
applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is 
based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or 
mental impairments of the employee or applicant.” § 12112(b)(5)(B). Title I of the ADA defines 
unlawful discrimination to include a variety of other things as well, such as limiting, segregating, or 
11
Weber: Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
1130 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
define “reasonable accommodation.”32 Instead, it lists examples of what 
the term may include. For purposes of employment, reasonable 
accommodation:  
may include—(A) making existing facilities used by 
employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals 
with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or 
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, 
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, 
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, 
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified 
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for 
individuals with disabilities.33 
Some of these accommodations are material in nature, for example, the 
provision of equipment or architectural modifications. Others are 
mandatory departures from neutral employer practices, such as employers’ 
scheduling demands, allocation of duties among workers, and training 
protocols. In the text of the ADA, Congress buttressed its requirement that 
employers depart from otherwise neutral rules by prohibiting standards, 
criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating 
on the basis of disability,34 as well as by outlawing qualification standards, 
employment tests, or other selection criteria that tend to screen out persons 
with disabilities unless the standard, test, or other criterion is shown to be 
job-related and consistent with business necessity.35 So not only may a 
variance or departure from an otherwise neutral rule or practice be required 
as a matter of reasonable accommodation,36 but also the neutral rule itself 
may be illegal when applied to an applicant or employee with a disability if 
it has a discriminatory effect or unjustified negative impact.  
                                                                                                                     
classifying job applicants or employees in ways that adversely affect their status or opportunities on 
the basis of disability, engaging in disparate impact discrimination, and improperly using 
employment tests. § 12112(b)(1), (6)–(7). 
 32. Even those who disagree with this proposition seem ultimately to change their minds 
when they consider the text and structure of the law. See, e.g., Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 
63 F.3d 131, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring) (“[T]he ADA contains a definition of 
‘reasonable accommodation’ [in § 12111(9)]. However, this definition explains only the sorts of 
modifications and assistance that are included within the phrase ‘reasonable accommodation’ and 
provides no guidance as to whether, or to what extent, the cost[s] of such items are relevant to a 
determination of their reasonableness.”). 
 33. § 12111(9). 
 34. § 12112(b)(3)(A). 
 35. § 12112(b)(6). 
 36. Commentators have emphasized this point. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson, “Neutral” 
Employer Policies and the ADA: The Implications of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority 
Systems, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2002) (“[I]mplicit in reasonable accommodation is the notion 
that policies may have to be changed, whether they be neutral policies or not. Employers . . . have a 
duty to alter the work environment, even if the employee . . . does not measure the same as the 
employee without a disability under facially-neutral criteria.”). 
12
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Unlike reasonable accommodation, “undue hardship” receives a 
statutory definition. It means “an action requiring significant difficulty or 
expense, when considered in light of [specified] factors.”37 The factors 
include the nature and cost of the accommodation; the overall financial 
resources of the facility involved; the number of persons employed there; 
the effect on expenses and resources or the other impact of the 
accommodation on the facility’s operation; the overall financial strength of 
the employer; the number of its employees; the number, type, and location 
of its facilities; and finally, the type of operation of the employer, including 
the composition, structure and functions of the work force, geographic 
separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the relevant facility to 
the employer.38 The statute places the burden of demonstrating undue 
hardship on the employer: The duty to accommodate applies “unless such 
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.”39 
The text and structure of the statute suggest a substantial obligation to 
provide accommodation up to the limit of hardship demonstrated by the 
employer. 
C.  The Legislative History  
If the reasonable accommodation-undue hardship term is thought to be 
ambiguous, authoritative legislative history is the first place to look for 
clarification. The legislative history of the unreasonable accommodation 
and undue hardship provision is extensive. Several features stand out: the 
intent by Congress to adopt interpretations of similar language in the 
regulations promulgated under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973;40 the nature and strength of the accommodation duty Congress meant 
to impose and the characteristics of the hardship defense; and the treatment 
of employer practices that are neutral on their face. 
1.  The Relationship to Section 504’s Regulations 
Congress rarely writes on a clean slate, and the ADA is no exception to 
this rule. Congress drew heavily on section 504 and its regulations when 
enacting the ADA. Thus, the legislative history of the reasonable 
accommodations-undue hardship provision of the ADA is partly a 
regulatory history of that earlier statute. The accommodation requirement 
originated in the regulations implementing section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which forbids disability discrimination by 
recipients of federal funding.41 These final rules became effective June 3, 
1977.42 
                                                                                                                     
 37. § 12111(10)(A). 
 38. § 12111(10)(B). 
 39. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 40. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)). 
 41. § 794(a). 
 42. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving or 
Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 42 Fed. Reg. 22676 (May 4, 1977). 
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Like the ADA, which drew on the regulations’ language thirteen years 
later, the section 504 regulations obliged employers who received federal 
funds to “make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or 
mental limitations” of a qualified person with a disability “unless the 
recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of its program.”43 As with the ADA, reasonable 
accommodation was not defined, but examples were provided: making 
facilities used by employees readily accessible and usable; undertaking job 
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules; acquiring or 
modifying equipment or devices; providing interpreters or readers; “and 
other similar actions.”44 The section 504 regulations, unlike the ADA, also 
lacked a clear definition of undue hardship, but as with the ADA, factors to 
be considered were specified as the overall size of the recipient’s program 
with regard to number of employees; the number and type of facilities and 
size of budget; the type of the operation, including composition and 
structure of the workforce; and the nature and cost of the accommodation 
needed.45 
2.  Standards for Accommodations 
Congress intended to incorporate the section 504 regulations’ standards 
for reasonable accommodation and undue hardship into the ADA.46 The 
ADA’s congressional supporters recognized that the costs of 
accommodations might be high. They noted that “expensive 
accommodations,” such as “readers for blind persons, interpreters for deaf 
persons, and physical accommodations for those with mobility 
impairments” would be required.47 Personal attendants, both during the 
workday and while an employee traveled on business, might also be a 
mandatory accommodation.48 Some accommodations that could involve 
                                                                                                                     
 43. 42 Fed. Reg. 22680 (1977) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a)). 
 44. Id. (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)). 
 45. Id. (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c)). On April 28, 1976, the President directed the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to coordinate the rulemaking for all other 
federal agencies, specifying that they were to issue regulations consistent with those HEW adopted. 
Coordination of Federal Agency Enforcement of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 43 
Fed. Reg. 2132 (Jan. 13, 1978). 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304 (“The 
ADA incorporates many of the standards of discrimination set out in regulations implementing 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodations unless it would result in an undue hardship on the operation of the business.”). 
Congress also imposed a duty of reasonable accommodation for individuals with disabilities in the 
Fair Housing Amendments of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)–(C) (2006)). 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 315 (also 
noting that costs of accommodations may be exaggerated); see also id. at 71–72, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 354 (discussing with approval case in which court required employer to provide 
reader to applicant with dyslexia for test for entry into training program for heavy equipment 
operator). 
 48. Id. at 64, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 346 (“As with readers and interpreters, the 
14
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disruption to standard operating procedures were specified as examples: 
constant shifts rather than day-night rotations for an employee with 
epilepsy; extra unpaid leave days to receive medical treatment or for 
recuperation (in an era before the Family and Medical Leave Act49); and 
modified schedules for persons with mobility impairments who depend on 
inaccessible public transportation.50 
As the last example indicates, Congress intended that accommodations 
not be limited to those that begin and end at the employer’s job site. In a 
detailed discussion of the reasonable accommodation requirement, the 
House Committee on Education and Labor considered the additional 
example of a job applicant who could not get to a store located in a mall 
that lacked an accessible entrance. The Committee stated: “The store 
should take the person’s application and determine if the person is 
qualified for the job. The question then becomes whether, with reasonable 
accommodation, the person can get to the job site. This reasonable 
accommodation, of course, has an undue hardship limitation.”51 But unless 
the hardship on the employer is undue, the law requires the employer to 
provide accommodations to make it possible for employees with 
disabilities to get to work. 
Moreover, as that interpretation and many of the others imply, the 
drafters of the ADA recognized that reasonable accommodation and undue 
hardship are not separate terms but two sides of the same coin: “As set 
forth in the substantive section of the Act, of course, the legal obligation of 
an entity to provide such an accommodation is depending on whether the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the entity’s 
business.”52 The minority members of the Committee voting out the bill 
commented with approval that in the final draft, “The linkage between 
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship was . . . clarified so that 
any duty of reasonable accommodation is limited by the concept of undue 
hardship.”53 
Judicial interpretations of section 504 in the years preceding adoption 
of the ADA embraced the interpretation of reasonable accommodation and 
                                                                                                                     
provision of an attendant to assist a person with a disability during parts of the workday may be a 
reasonable accommodation depending on the circumstances of the individual case. Attendants may, 
for example, be required for traveling and other job-related functions. This issue must be dealt with 
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether an undue hardship is created by providing 
attendants.”). 
 49. The Family and Medical Leave Act was enacted in 1993. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 
(1993). It guarantees long-term employees in public agencies and larger private companies up to 
twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year for specified medical and family purposes. 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 2601–2654 (2006). 
 50. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 62–63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345. 
Congress also emphasized that the obligation was substantial by declaring it to be “significantly 
higher” than the duty to provide reasonable accommodations for religion under Title VII. Id. at 68, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350; see, e.g., Anderson, supra note 36, at 5. 
 51. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 61, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 343. 
 52. Id. at 57–58, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 339–40. 
 53. Id. at 165, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 443. 
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undue hardship as two sides of the same coin. For example, Prewitt v. 
United States Postal Service involved a Vietnam veteran whose wounds 
limited his ability to lift items over his head.54 Among his claims were that 
the Postal Service had to accommodate him by lowering the ledge on 
which mail was stacked or giving him a handle device to reach the higher 
shelves.55 The court reversed a grant of summary judgment against the 
plaintiff and said that on remand, 
If the issue of reasonable accommodation is raised, the agency 
must then be prepared to make a further showing that 
accommodation cannot reasonably be made that would enable 
the . . . applicant to perform the essentials of the job 
adequately and safely; in this regard, the postal service must 
“demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of its program.”56  
In Mantolete v. Bolger, the Postal Service refused to hire an applicant 
with epilepsy because of its assumption that she would be exposed to a 
greater risk of injury.57 The court overturned a grant of summary judgment 
to the employer, adopting Prewitt’s analysis and treating the absence of a 
reasonable accommodation as an affirmative defense, which equates that 
concept to undue hardship.58 The court declared, “[T]he burden of 
persuasion in proving inability to accommodate always remains on the 
employer.”59 It said, “[O]nce the employer presents credible evidence that 
accommodation would not reasonably be possible, the plaintiff has the 
burden of coming forward with evidence concerning her individual 
capabilities and suggestions for possible accommodations to rebut the 
employer’s evidence.”60 
Congress relied on these judicial interpretations when it enacted the 
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship provisions of the ADA.61 
                                                                                                                     
 54. 662 F.2d 292, 297 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).  
 55. Id. at 305, 310 n.25. 
 56. Id. at 310 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a)) 
 57. 767 F.2d 1416, 1420 (9th Cir. 1985).  
 58. Id. at 1423. 
 59. Id. at 1424. 
 60. Id.; see also Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 1989) (“An unreasonable 
accommodation is one which would impose undue hardship on the operation of its program.”) 
(internal quotation omitted); Hall v. U.S. Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1988) (“An 
accommodation is not reasonable, and will therefore not be required, if, for instance, it imposes an 
undue hardship upon the operation of the federal employer.”). 
 61. Prewitt is cited with approval in the Title I legislative history with regard to both undue 
hardship and discriminatory qualification standards. H.R. REP  NO. 101-485(III), at 42 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 465. Mantolete is cited with approval in Title I’s legislative 
history on the issue of the defense based on a direct threat to safety. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 
57 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 339. Judge Jon Newman pointed out that 
Mantolete and Prewitt adopt the two-sides-of-the-same-coin approach to reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 145 (2d 
16
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As noted, the legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress 
intended courts to follow the interpretations of section 504 when 
construing the ADA. Moreover, in 1992, before ADA case law 
independent of section 504 emerged, Congress amended section 504 to 
conform the interpretation of the employment provisions of that statute and 
those under ADA Title I.62 
3.  Standards for Undue Hardship 
Accommodations that are not reasonable because they constitute an 
undue hardship are those that require “significant difficulty or expense,” 
something that varies with the nature and size of the employer’s 
operations.63 The legislative history states that small enterprises may have 
limited obligations, but a large school district “might be required to make 
available a teacher’s aide to a blind applicant for a teaching job,” and a 
state welfare agency might have to expend the resources to hire an 
interpreter for a deaf employee.64 The reality that accommodations such as 
architectural modifications or shared assistive devices benefit more than 
one employee is an additional factor to be considered against a finding of 
undue hardship.65 The availability of outside funding also counts against 
undue hardship; if the employee pays for part of the accommodation, only 
                                                                                                                     
Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring) (“The Ninth Circuit appears to equate ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ with the absence of ‘undue hardship,’ viewing these concepts as opposite sides of 
the same coin. . . . A similar approach appears to be taken by the Fifth Circuit.”). Even those 
reluctant to rely on legislative history are inclined to rely on accepted constructions of comparable 
statutory terms in the same area of the law in instances of statutory ambiguity. See Manning, supra 
note 29, at 81 & n.41. 
 62. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 506, 106 Stat. 4428 
(1992) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)). 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2000). Robert Burgdorf, who drafted the original Americans 
with Disabilities Act bill introduced in Congress in 1988, traced the origin of the “significant” 
language and said it may have originated in a report for a proposal to distinguish disability 
accommodation from religious accommodation by using the term “significant hardship” for the 
former. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources stated that hardship would excuse 
the making of an accommodation only if it was “‘exceeding or violating propriety or fitness: 
excessive, immoderate, or unwarranted.’” Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities 
Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 413, 463 n.249 (1991) (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-316, at 8 n.5 (1979)). 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 67 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350. 
 65. Id. at 69, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 351 (“For example, a ramp installed for a 
new employee who uses a wheelchair not only benefits that employee but will also benefit mobility-
impaired applicants and employees in the future. Assistive devices for hearing and visually-
impaired persons may be shared by more than one employee. . . .”). For an illuminating discussion 
of the side benefits of accommodations on employees with disabilities and those without, see 
Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 841–42 (2008) 
(discussing improved supervisory practices and other examples). As the ramp and communication 
devices examples suggest, the Committee was not separating reasonableness of the accommodation 
from undue hardship, to whatever extent the relevant determination might depend on costs and 
benefits. 
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the employer’s share should be considered for undue hardship.66 The 
House Committee on the Judiciary rejected deeming the cost of an 
accommodation above 10% of an employee’s salary as undue hardship per 
se, believing that the more flexible approach of the section 504 regulations 
was superior.67 The Committee endorsed Nelson v. Thornburgh,68 a section 
504 case in which, as the Committee described it, a group of blind state 
welfare workers requested accommodations whose costs were 
“substantial,” including the use of readers, Braille forms, and a computer 
capable of handling data in Braille. Since the costs were only a small 
fraction of the agency’s personnel budget, the accommodations were not an 
undue hardship.69 Significantly, this is not a cost-benefit comparison, but 
rather a cost-total budget comparison. The drafters of the ADA rejected the 
use of cost-benefit analysis in framing the reasonable accommodation-
undue hardship term.70  
                                                                                                                     
 66. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 69 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 351–52. 
 67. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 41 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 464. 
 68. 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff’d, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 69. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 41 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 464. 
 70.  EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, at ¶ 45 (Oct. 17, 2002) (“Neither 
the statute nor the legislative history supports a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether a specific 
accommodation causes an undue hardship. Whether the cost of a reasonable accommodation 
imposes an undue hardship depends on the employer’s resources, not on the individual’s salary, 
position, or status (e.g., full-time versus part-time, salary versus hourly wage, permanent versus 
temporary).”) (footnote omitted), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/ 
accommodation.html; see, e.g., Gregory Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating “Undue  
Hardship” Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 1, 4 (1990) (“[T]he 
language of the statute, its legislative history, and the inapplicability in the disability employment 
accommodation context of the key premises underlying the efficiency orientation all indicate that 
little if any weight should be given to efficiency considerations in determining the availability of the 
undue hardship defense for ADA-covered employers.”); id. at 23 (noting that policy emerging from 
section 504 case law interpretations embodied in ADA “indicates that a reasonable accommodation 
must be made, regardless of the size of benefits that will result, so long as the cost of the 
accommodation is not unduly large relative to the overall financial capacity of the employer”); 
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 22–26; id. at 32 (“[R]easonable accommodation under the 
ADA . . . . requires more than efficient reductions of risk, since it demands equal opportunity for the 
disabled, although in a form limited by the employer’s ability to bear the cost of 
accommodation . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis Without Analyzing Costs or 
Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1895, 
1907 (2007) (“[A]n accommodation might be required under the ADA even if its costs outweigh its 
benefits . . . . The ADA does not enact Messrs Kaldor and Hicks’s understanding of economic 
efficiency.”) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 1898 (criticizing judicial approach that uses cost-
benefit analysis to determine reasonableness of accommodation without considering text, history, or 
structure of ADA). But see Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability 
Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79 (2003) (employing cost-benefit balancing in analyzing 
reasonableness of accommodations under ADA; collecting and analyzing judicial and academic 
sources that support cost-benefit approaches). Some writers criticize the ADA for its failure to 
mandate cost-benefit analysis for accommodations. See, e.g., Carolyn L. Weaver, Incentives Versus 
Controls in Federal Disability Policy, in DISABILITY AND WORK: RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 3, 5 
(Carolyn L. Weaver 1991) (“The central flaw of the ADA . . . .  is in the imposition on employers of 
a duty to ‘accommodate’ the mental or physical limitations of the disabled worker or applicant 
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4.  Treatment of Neutral Rules 
The legislative history displays an awareness of the discriminatory 
effects of neutral rules and the need to make departures from neutral rules 
as a matter of providing accommodations.71 The House Committee on 
Education and Labor explained that variances from neutral rules, such as 
set work schedules or rotations of day and night shifts, or provision of 
extra unpaid leave days, may be mandatory accommodations if they do not 
cause the employer undue hardship.72 The congressional understanding 
matched a 1983 report from the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 
which stressed the need to address the problems posed by employers’ 
standard operating procedures and conventional modes of operation on 
people with disabilities.73 Congress manifested a similar awareness of the 
difficulty with uniformly applied, neutral policies and practices of 
employers by explaining that a “facially neutral” qualification standard, 
test, or employee-selection criterion with a negative effect on people with 
disabilities is discriminatory unless the employer can show that it is job-
related and consistent with business necessity.74 Congress enacted a 
prohibition on this form of disparate impact discrimination, which stands 
independent of the requirement of reasonable accommodation up to the 
limit of undue hardship.75  
Departures from rules that apply to everyone else may be viewed as 
preferences. This suggests an analogy to racial preferences embodied in 
some affirmative action programs. In Southeastern Community College v. 
Davis, a 1979 section 504 case concerning accommodations in the training 
program for a student nurse who was deaf, the Supreme Court upheld 
rejection of the student from the program despite her claim that it could be 
modified to accommodate her.76 The Court said that accommodations of 
                                                                                                                     
without weighing the expected benefits of such accommodation.”); cf. Issacharoff & Nelson, supra 
note 8, at 344–45 (“[T]he extent of the accommodation standard is defined not by a uniform 
obligation across all employers, but by the ability of any employer to pay, regardless of fault or 
ensuing competitive disadvantage.”).  
 71. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 37–38 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 105 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 388 (discussing public accommodation provisions). 
 72. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
 73. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 
102 (1983) (“Discrimination against handicapped people cannot be eliminated if programs, 
activities, and tasks are always structured in the ways people with ‘normal’ physical and mental 
abilities customarily undertake them. Adjustments or modifications of opportunities to permit 
handicapped people to participate fully have been broadly termed ‘reasonable accommodation.’”). 
This report, whose drafters included the person who wrote the original ADA bill, provided a 
“statutory blueprint” for what eventually became the ADA. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Restoring the 
ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st Century, 13 TEX. J. C.L. &  C.R. 241, 244 (2008). 
 74. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 42 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 465.42 
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3), (6) (2006). 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3), (6) (2006). 
 76. 442 U.S. 397, 414 (1979). The question arose in the context of whether the student was 
an “otherwise qualified individual” protected by section 504, given the impossibility of using 
lipreading skills in portions of the training program and registered nursing practice, for the evidence 
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close, individual attention by an instructor to guarantee patient safety 
during the clinical portion of the nursing program and waiver of required 
courses amounted to “affirmative action” and were more than the statute 
intended.77 
But in a subsequent case, Alexander v. Choate,78 the Court clarified the 
distinction Davis sought to make between reasonable accommodation and 
affirmative action, stating that Davis meant to exclude from mandatory 
accommodations only those that make fundamental alterations in 
programs, which is essentially the undue hardship standard embodied in 
the ADA.79 In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that its use of the term 
“affirmative action” in discussing section 504 failed to recognize the 
difference between affirmative action to remediate past discrimination and 
accommodation to eliminate obstacles to inclusion.80 It then said: 
Regardless of the aptness of our choice of words in Davis, it 
is clear from the context of Davis that the term “affirmative 
action” referred to those “changes,” “adjustments,” or 
“modifications” to existing programs that would be 
“substantial,” or that would constitute “fundamental 
alteration[s] in the nature of a program[,]” rather than to those 
changes that would be reasonable accommodations.81 
The bottom line is thus an obligation of reasonable accommodation up 
to a limit of undue hardship, in which the undue hardship standard means 
substantial or fundamental change in programs, and a retreat from using 
the term “affirmative action” to describe disability accommodations. 
Notably, the legislative history of the ADA cites Choate and completely 
omits any mention of Davis.82 The drafters of the ADA were aware of 
                                                                                                                     
indicated that voice was sometimes the only way to communicate immediate demands for 
instruments or medications, and masks had to be worn during surgery and in other settings. Id. at 
403, 405–06. 
 77. Id. at 409–10. The Court conceded that “the line between a lawful refusal to extend 
affirmative action and illegal discrimination” will not always be clear. Id. at 412. 
 78. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
 79. Id. at 300 (“Davis . . . struck a balance between the statutory rights of the handicapped to 
be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees in preserving the integrity 
of their programs: while a grantee need not be required to make ‘fundamental’ or ‘substantial’ 
modifications to accommodate the handicapped, it may be required to make ‘reasonable’ ones.”). 
 80. Id. at 300 n.20 (citing Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982); Mark E. 
Martin, Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 885–86 (1980); Donald Jay Olenick, Note, 
Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 AfterSoutheastern, 80 COLUM. L. 
REV. 171, 185–86 (1980)). 
 81. Id. at 301. 
 82. The references to Choate are in the portions dealing with the government services portion 
of the statute, as might be expected since Choate concerned the scope of coverage provided under a 
state Medicaid program. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 30, 61, 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 312, 343, 367. Congress also acted to bury the Davis case by enacting a 
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Choate, and they could hardly have failed to notice that it altered Davis’s 
understanding of some accommodations as forbidden affirmative action. 
But they chose simply to ignore Davis and instead to cite Choate.83  
D.  Agency Interpretations 
Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
courts must defer to the interpretation of a statute by an agency charged 
with enforcing the statute, as long as the agency’s interpretation is a 
reasonable one.84 Congress charged the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission with enforcing Title I of the ADA.85 The interpretations of the 
words “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” advanced by the 
                                                                                                                     
definition of mandatory auxiliary aids and services that potentially could have kept the student 
nurse in her program. See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to 
Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 428–29 (1991) (“To avoid similar misinterpretations of the 
ADA, Congress added a subsection to the definition of ‘auxiliary aids and services’ to clarify that 
the Act does include the accommodation requirements disallowed by Justice [Lewis] Powell.”) 
(referring to 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). 
 83. In School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987), the Court repeated Choate’s 
understanding of what Davis said about accommodations, and then went on to state that “Employers 
have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee,”  
id. at 288 n.19 (emphasis added). References to Arline are also sprinkled throughout the ADA 
legislative history, although typically in contexts other than interpreting the meaning of reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship, which is understandable because Arline primarily dealt with 
coverage under section 504 of an individual with a contagious disease. See H R. REP. NO. 101-
485(II), at 30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 312 (discussing nature of disability 
discrimination); id. at 53, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335 (discussing definition of 
disability); id. at 57, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 339 (discussing direct-threat standard); id. 
at 76, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 359 (discussing direct-threat standard); H.R. REP. NO. 
101-485(III), at 30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453 (discussing definition of 
disability); id. at 34, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 457 (discussing direct-threat standard); id. 
at 45, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 468 (discussing direct-threat standard); H.R.REP. NO. 101-
485(IV), at 37 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 526 (discussing direct-threat standard); 
id. at 81–82, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 564 (dissenting views concerning definition of 
disability). 
 84. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the 
statute which it administers, . . . [and] the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as 
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”) (footnote omitted). This proposition 
is often the beginning of the argument and not its end because if a statutory term is unclear, the 
agency interpretation may be as well. Additional problems with the application of Chevron abound. 
See, e.g., Molot, supra note 28, at 19 n.77 (“Of course, big questions remain regarding how courts 
go about applying Chevron.”) (emphasis omitted); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial 
Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 
1051, 1068–72 (1995) (discussing when to resort to agency interpretation under Chevron). But 
congruence between the meaning assigned by the enforcing agency and the meaning derived from 
other sources provides good support for a proposed interpretation. 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2006). 
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EEOC reinforce the idea that emerges from the legislative history that the 
duty placed on employers is not a modest burden but a serious one; the 
interpretations further support the two-sides-of-the-same-coin approach. 
Both regulations and interpretive guidance documents issued by the EEOC 
demonstrate these propositions. 
1.  The EEOC Regulations 
With regard to reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, the 
EEOC regulations for Title I of the ADA repeat the prohibition in the 
statute, stating that it is unlawful for covered entities to fail to make 
reasonable accommodations unless they can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the business 
operations of the employer.86 Like the statute, the regulations rely more on 
example or typology than definition when discussing reasonable 
accommodation. Reasonable accommodations are 1) modifications or 
adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant 
with a disability to be considered for a desired position; 2) modifications or 
adjustments to the work environment, or the manner or circumstances 
under which the position is customarily performed, that enable the 
individual to perform the position’s essential functions; or 3) modifications 
or adjustments that enable an employee with a disability to enjoy equal 
benefits and privileges or employment as are enjoyed by the employer’s 
other similarly situated employees who do not have disabilities.87 The 
regulations save their definitional language for undue hardship, and 
essentially track the statute when they provide the definition.88 The 
regulations specifically list difficulties imposed on co-workers, not as part 
of what may make an accommodation unreasonable, but as part of what 
may make hardship undue for the employer.89  
                                                                                                                     
 86. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (2009). The following subsection repeats the statutory prohibition 
on denying employment opportunities to otherwise qualified applicants or employees with 
disabilities based on the need to make reasonable accommodations. § 1630.9(b). Other subsections 
provide that failure to receive technical assistance is no excuse for failure to accommodate and that 
a person with a disability need not accept an accommodation but may lose the status of a qualified 
individual if unable to perform the essential functions of the job without the accommodation. 
§ 1630.9(c)–(d).  
 87. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1) (2009). 
 88. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (2009). 
 89. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (2009) (including with “[f]actors to be considered [in] 
determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship” on the employer “the 
impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties”). As Professor Cheryl Anderson 
notes, many accommodations might be expected to impose some hardship on co-workers. 
Anderson, supra note 36, at 36 (“[N]ot only reassignment, but other accommodations as well, such 
as modification of work schedules, job restructuring, and the like . . . . intrude[] upon the 
expectations of other employees.”). But these hardships are relevant to ADA cases only insofar as 
they may cause undue hardship on the employer. For a contrary view, which is supported in part by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002), see Alex B. 
Long, The ADA’s Reasonable Accommodation Requirement and “Innocent Third Parties,” 68 MO. 
L. REV. 863, 901 (2003) (arguing that reasonableness of accommodations hinges in part on effects 
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2.  The Interpretive Guidance 
The EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance sheds further light on the meaning 
of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship.90 The Guidance places 
a strong emphasis on equality of opportunity, defined as “an opportunity to 
attain the same level of performance, or to enjoy the same level of benefits 
and privileges of employment as are available to the average similarly 
situated employee without a disability.”91 The Guidance stresses that the 
employer’s overall resources have to be considered in the undue hardship 
determination: “[T]o demonstrate that the cost of an accommodation poses 
an undue hardship, an employer would have to show that the cost is undue 
as compared to the employer’s budget.”92 A simple comparison of the 
accommodation’s cost to the salary of the employee is not adequate.93 The 
                                                                                                                     
on other employees and proposing that accommodations requiring any adverse employment action 
with regard to other employees be considered not reasonable). Professor Long acknowledges that 
the undue hardship provision focuses on hardship to employers, not co-employees. Id. at 904. 
Although his view about reasonable accommodation can claim consistency with Title VII 
interpretations and some virtue as a bright-line rule, the contention of this Article is that it gives an 
incorrect meaning to reasonable accommodation independent from undue hardship and would 
inappropriately freeze the interpretation of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, rather 
than leave development of that term to juries over time. Title VII, of course, lacks a reasonable 
accommodation term except as applied to religion cases, and the term there has a different meaning 
than that in the ADA, as Professor Long notes. Id. at 900 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485(II), at 68 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350). Moreover, Title VII protects from 
discrimination all individuals of whatever race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, while the 
ADA protects only persons with disabilities. See Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA 
Reasonable Accommodation Issues: Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
439, 440 (2002) (stressing importance of contrast); see also Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist 
Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial Dissonance, The Supreme Court’s Response, and the 
Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 68 (1999) (noting, perhaps with 
understatement, “The ADA [i]s [m]ore [c]omplicated than Title VII and the ADEA.”). As a matter 
of policy, the focus on co-worker burdens also ignores the benefits to co-workers that may flow 
when employers generalize accommodations such as telecommuting or ergonomic workplaces. See 
Emens, supra note 65, at 841. 
 90. The Supreme Court views EEOC interpretations of this type as less than controlling 
authority but notes that they “‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which 
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 
141–42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (referring to Title VII 
guidelines); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such 
as those in opinion letters–like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines, . . . are ‘entitled to respect’ under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134 (1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have the ‘power to persuade,’ 
ibid.”). At the very least, the EEOC’s interpretation is subject to Skidmore deference. See generally 
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 903–08 (2001) 
(distinguishing proper situations for greater deference under Ch vron and lesser deference under 
Skidmore and collecting authorities). 
 91. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1630, app. § 1630.9 (2008). 
 92. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.15(d). 
 93. Id. 
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analysis is not a cost-benefits analysis of the accommodation. The costs are 
to be balanced against the available resources of the employer, not against 
the benefits of the particular accommodation, much less the marginal 
economic contribution of the employee.94 
The EEOC’s original Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable 
Accommodation and Undue Hardship elaborates on the meaning of 
reasonable accommodation: “The statutory definition of ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ does not include any quantitative, financial, or other 
limitations regarding the extent of the obligation to make changes to a job 
or work environment.”95 The interpretation continues: 
The only statutory limitation on an employer’s obligation 
to provide “reasonable accommodation” is that no such 
change or modification is required if it would cause 
“undue hardship” on the employer. Undue hardship 
addresses quantitative, financial, or other limitations on an 
employer’s ability to provide reasonable accommodation.96 
The EEOC deleted the boldface font of the first sentence when it 
revised the Guidance in 2002 but retained its language and merely 
substituted a more detailed description of undue hardship for the one in the 
original.97 
E.   The Historical Context 
As noted above, even the most adamant of textualists take note of the 
historical context in which laws are passed.98 In 1988–90, when the ADA 
was written and enacted, there were social developments that affected 
everyone but, in particular, would have been in the consciousness of the 
members of Congress who drafted and voted on the ADA. Three 
developments to note are the excitement over technological advances, the 
                                                                                                                     
 94. See EEOC, supra note 70, at question 45. 
 95. EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1999 WL 33305876, at *3 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 EEOC 
Reasonable Accommodation Guidance]. This Guidance was modified after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). See EEOC, supra note 70. The original 
document is used here because it may provide a better indication of the original meaning of the Act 
than the Supreme Court’s comments in Barnett. See infra text accompanying notes 195–228 
(discussing Barnett), but as noted below, the changes are not consequential. 
 96. 1999 EEOC Reasonable Accommodation Guidance, supra note 95. See Carrie Griffin 
Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable Accommodation and Resistance Under the ADA, 
29 BERKELEY J. EMP. &  LAB. L. 59, 111 (2008) (discussing EEOC Guidance). 
 97. EEOC, supra note 70 (“The only statutory limitation on an employer’s obligation to 
provide ‘reasonable accommodation’ is that no such change or modification is required if it would 
cause ‘undue hardship’ to the employer. ‘Undue hardship’ means significant difficulty or expense 
and focuses on the resources and circumstances of the particular employer in relationship to the cost 
or difficulty of providing a specific accommodation.”). 
 98. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text (discussing study of contemporary social 
context in interpreting statutory terms).  
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recent emergence of the social model of disability, and the rise of a popular 
movement in support of disability civil rights. 
1.  Technology 
The era displayed an overwhelming optimism about technology and 
how it would improve the world. Many developments taken for granted 
today were just emerging and appeared full of promise: The Apple 
Macintosh, often recognized as the first fully successful personal computer, 
debuted in 1984;99 e-mail came into wide use in 1990, and soon people 
began talking about the World Wide Web.100 Mobile telephones went from 
brick-like to pocket-sized around the same time.101 These technological 
changes affected the expectations for disability accommodations. New 
high-tech adaptations of the late 1980s included telecommunications 
advances as well as software and hardware to assist individuals with 
mobility, sensory, and orthopedic impairments.102 Assistive technology for 
people with disabilities was likely to be particularly prominent in the 
minds of members of Congress interested in disability issues at the time of 
the ADA’s passage, for Congress in 1987 amended the Developmental 
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act to include provisions for 
assistive technology103 and in 1988 enacted the Technology-Related 
Assistance for Individuals with Disabilities Act.104 If technology was 
expected to make life in general easier, it certainly was expected to make 
accommodating people with disabilities easier.105 Senators and 
                                                                                                                     
 99. See Steve Lohr, Creating Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1997, § 6, at 14, available at 1997 
WLNR 4854101. 
 100. See The History of Email, Thinkquest, http://library.thinkquest.org/04oct/ 
00047/email.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). The first major action-thriller about the Internet that I 
recall was punningly titled “The Net,” and did not appear until 1995. See Internet Movie Database, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0113957/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
 101. See Matt Richtel, Promoting the Car Phone, Despite Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/07/technology/07distracted.html?_r=1&hp 
(describing event at Soldier Field in Chicago in 1983 launching mass-market cellphone service). 
 102. Notably, an entire title of the ADA, Title IV, is devoted to telecommunications for 
persons with disabilities. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2006). Federal legislation to promote assistive 
technology was first passed in 1988, amended in 1994, then replaced by the Assistive Technology 
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-394, 112 Stat. 3627 (1998). Nat’l Ctr. on Accessible Info. Tech., 
What Is Assistive Technology?, http://www.washington.edu/accessit/articles?109 (last visited Aug. 
28, 2010). 
 103. See Pub. L. No. 100-146, §§ 102(16), 202 (b)(5)(B), 101 Stat. 840 (1987). 
 104. Pub. L. 100-407, 102 Stat. 1044 (1988). The Act was sponsored by Representative Jim 
Jeffords and Senator Tom Harkin. Patricia A. Morrissey & Robert Silverstein, The Technology-
Related Assistance for Individuals with Disabilities Act of 1988, AM. REHABILITATION , Summer 
1989, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0842/is_n2_v15/ai_8200899/. These 
legislators became two of the prime movers behind the ADA. 
 105. Justice Powell recognized the impact of technology as early as 1979, though he spoke in 
terms of fixing people with disabilities rather than adapting the environment. S e Se. Cmty. Coll. v. 
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979) (“Technological advances can be expected to enhance 
opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped or otherwise to qualify them for some useful 
25
Weber: Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
1144 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
Representatives who drafted and voted on the ADA—like members of the 
public at large—would have expected that technology would transform 
accommodations that in 1990 imposed undue hardship into the reasonable 
accommodations of a few years later. 
2.  The Social Model of Disability 
The late 1980s had just seen the emergence of the social model of 
disability, that is, an understanding that physical and mental conditions 
themselves do not necessarily disable. Instead, disability arises from a 
dynamic between physical or mental conditions and the barriers—either of 
environments or attitudes—that keep people with disabilities from full 
participation in work and in society.106 This model recognizes that a person 
                                                                                                                     
employment.”); see also Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(“Most jobs in organizations public or private involve team work under supervision rather than 
solitary unsupervised work, and team work under supervision generally cannot be performed at 
home without a substantial reduction in the quality of the employee’s performance. This will no 
doubt change as communications technology advances, but is the situation today.”). Some sources 
confirm that technology has advanced to the point that even if Vande Zande had been correct about 
working from home in 1995, it is no longer correct today. See, e.g., Jennifer Tennant, The 
Reasonableness of Working from Home in the Digital Age, 5 REV. DISABILITY STUD., no. 4, 2009 at 
10. See generally Burgdorf, supra note 73, at 314–54 (discussing impact of expected technological 
change on accessibility). 
 106. See, e.g., Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond Stigma: Social Interaction, 
Discrimination, and Activism, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 3, 6–14 (1988) (developing and elaborating on 
minority group model of people with disabilities); Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptably 
Employable Image: Disability and Capitalism, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 172, 174 
(Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997) (describing “minority-group model of disability”); see also Paula E. 
Berg, Ill/legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. &  POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (1999) (“This social-political model rejects 
the premise of the moral and biomedical perspectives that disability is inherent within the 
individual. . . . [I]t understands disability as contextual and relational[,] . . . as a broader social 
construct reflecting society’s dominant ideology and cultural assumptions. While it acknowledges 
the existence of biologically based differences, the social-political model locates the meaning of 
these differences—and the individual’s experience of them as burdensome—in society’s 
stigmatizing attitudes and biased structures rather than in the individual.”). Some criticism of the 
model has emerged, see Adam Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1251, 1285–1306 (2007); Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability 
Civil Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203 (2007) (finding limits in social model and putting forward 
disability human rights paradigm, which builds off social-model, development-rights, and 
capabilities ideas); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA=s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil 
Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335 (2001) (noting limits on civil rights approach as embodied 
in ADA), but others have defended the model, see, e.g., Mark C. Weber,  Disability Rights, 
Disability Discrimination, and Social Insurance, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 575 (2009).  The Fine and 
Asch article may be the clearest articulation of the model in the period before the ADA, but the idea 
took root ten or more years earlier and can be traced still farther back to the work of Professor 
Jacobus tenBroek and others in the 1960s. See JENNIFER L. ERKULWATER, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND 
THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SAFETY NET 29 (2006) (“[T]he social model . . . emerged in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s to challenge the medical model.”). See generally Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. 
Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809, 814–16 (1966) (urging 
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using a wheelchair for mobility is not disabled but for the existence of 
curbs, stairs, and other obstacles in the physical environment, and the 
discriminatory attitudes of individuals with control over economic and 
social goods.107 By identifying the environment of physical conditions and 
human attitudes as the thing to be changed, the model encourages people to 
look for accommodations that need to be made rather than characteristics 
of the person that need to be fixed.108 The ADA, with its focus on 
eliminating physical and attitudinal barriers rather than ameliorating what 
is “wrong” with people with disabilities, embodies the social model.109 The 
whole point of the accommodation duty in the ADA is to treat the barriers 
in the environment as not natural or permanent but instead subject to 
removal by the provision of accommodations.110 Congress could hardly 
have been ignorant of the significance of this emerging model in thinking 
about what would be considered a reasonable accommodation and what 
would be deemed to impose undue hardship.111  
3.  The Social Movement 
Closely connected to the development of the social model, there was a 
growing social movement of people with disabilities, which Congress 
would have expected to continue to change attitudes about what is 
considered normal and which accommodations are to be expected, rather 
than extraordinary.112 The 1970s featured a well publicized sit-in at the 
                                                                                                                     
“integrationist” rather than “custodialist” approach to disability). 
 107. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. &  LAB. L. 476, 480–81 (2000) (“‘Disability,’ under this conception, resides as much in the 
attitudes of society as in the characteristics of the disabled individual.”). 
 108. See ERKULWATER, supra note 106, at 30–31 (2006) (noting importance of social model in 
shifting focus of advocacy groups toward changes in social environment). 
 109. Burgdorf, supra note 73, at 263 (“The ADA embodies a social concept of discrimination 
that takes the view that many limitations resulting from actual or perceived impairments flow, not 
from limitations of the individual, but, rather, from the existence of unnecessary barriers to full 
participation in society and its institutions.”); see Wendy Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful 
Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 150 (2005) (“[S]ome scholars 
have credited the political awareness engendered by the minority model for the passage of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and comparable civil rights legislation.”) (collecting authorities). 
 110. See Burgdorf, supra note 73, at 265 (“The ADA is based on a social or civil rights model 
(sometimes referred to as a socio-political model), in contrast to the traditional ‘medical model.’ It 
views the limitations that arise from disabilities as largely the result of prejudice and discrimination 
rather than as purely the inevitable result of deficits in the individual.”); see also Emens, supra note 
65, at 878 (2008) (“Disability law thus appears to flip the assimilationist demand on its head. That 
is, instead of demanding that employees assimilate, disability law seems to require the environment, 
rather than the individual, to change.”) (footnote omitted). 
 111. See Cook, supra note 82, at 441 (“Congress was well-aware in enacting the ADA that 
severe prejudicial attitudes are ‘faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.’ Congress’s solution 
was not to maintain the isolation of persons with disabilities but, strongly to the contrary, to 
‘assur[e] equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for such individuals.’”) (quoting findings in ADA) (footnotes omitted). 
 112. The militant disability rights movement is sometimes traced to Ed Roberts and other 
students with physical disabilities who roomed in the hospital at University of California-
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Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Joseph A. 
Califano Jr.’s office and related nationwide demonstrations to force the 
Carter administration to adopt final regulations to implement section 
504.113 The 1980s witnessed noisy protests over various proposed changes 
in federal regulations pertaining to disability discrimination and the failure 
to name a deaf president for Gallaudet University; in other places, 
demonstrators chained their wheelchairs to public transit facilities and 
large numbers of disability rights lawsuits were prosecuted.114 There was 
every reason to believe that the disability rights movement would grow and 
cause the degree of social change that the movement for racial equality and 
the women’s rights movement did in previous decades. The expectation of 
change of social attitudes meant that legislators voting on the ADA had 
strong justification to expect that what would have been viewed as not 
reasonable in 1990 would be seen as reasonable a few years later. In fact, 
for Congress the ADA was itself part of an escalating series of laws 
prohibiting disability discrimination, from the civil rights provisions of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibiting disability discrimination in federally 
assisted activity in general,115 to laws barring disability discrimination in 
the Foreign Service,116 in unions representing federal employees,117 in 
programs conducted under the Full Employment and Balanced Growth 
Act,118 in air travel,119 and in sale or rental of housing.120 No better 
                                                                                                                     
Berkeley—the only residence on campus that could accommodate them—during the late 1960s. 
They benefited from and demanded the further implementation of technology to make education 
more accessible, and they collaboratively developed theories about disability in society. See JOSEPH 
P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY : PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 41–53 
(1993) (discussing emergence of disability rights movement at Berkeley). In fact, the movement 
stretches back much earlier and includes the demonstrations by the League of the Physically 
Handicapped against exclusion of workers with disabilities from New Deal jobs programs. See Paul 
K. Longmore & David Goldberger, The League of the Physically Handicapped and the Great 
Depression, in WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY  53, 65–85 (Paul K. 
Longmore ed., 2003). 
 113. See Cook, supra note 82, at 394 (describing sit-in at Califano’s office); Ravi Malhotra, 
The Politics of the Disability Rights Movements, NEW POLITICS, Summer 2001, at 65, 69–70, 
available at http://dawn.thot.net/ravi_malhotra.html (describing demonstrations in nine cities, 
including Washington, D.C., where 300 demonstrators sat in at HEW for twenty-eight hours and 
San Francisco, where disability advocates occupied HEW offices for twenty-five days). 
 114. See Burgdorf, supra note 73, at 294–95 (citing additional examples as well); see also 
DORIS ZAMES FLEISHER &  FRIEDA ZAMES, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 57–70 (2001) 
(describing proliferation of protests against inaccessible public transit); SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 
65–70 (also discussing additional examples of protests); cf. OLIVER SACKS, SEEING VOICES: A 
JOURNEY INTO THE WORLD OF THE DEAF 125–59 (1989) (describing Gallaudet demonstrations). 
 115. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791–794a (2006). 
 116. 22 U.S.C. § 3905(b)(1) (2006). 
 117. 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(4) (2006). 
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 3151(a) (2006). 
 119. 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a) (2006). 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)–(2) (2006). Federal laws against disability discrimination stretch 
back at least to the 1948 enactment of a statute barring employment discrimination based on 
physical disability in the Civil Service. Pub. L. No. 617, 62 Stat. 351 (1948). The Architectural 
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evidence of the growing strength of the social movement for equal rights 
for persons with disabilities could possibly have been before Congress, nor 
could there have been any better proof to the individuals voting on the 
ADA’s language that popular expectations for “reasonable” societal 
adaptation to the needs of people with disabilities would grow.  
It is something of a commonplace among writers on disability 
discrimination topics to say that the development of the ADA has been 
hampered by the lack of a real social movement behind it, that the law 
outstripped the social agitation needed for its continued vitality.121 This 
view, however, ignores the sit-ins at Secretary Califano’s office and the 
branch offices of HEW that led to the implementation of the section 504 
regulations,122 the other demonstrations,123 the lawsuits, the letter-writing 
and telephone campaigns, and all the other public actions that furthered 
disability consciousness during the period from the 1960s to the 1980s and 
ultimately caused the transition from requests for charity to demands for 
rights.124  
                                                                                                                     
Barriers Act, requiring accessibility for federal public spaces, came into being in 1968. Pub. L. No. 
90-480, 82 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151–4157 ( 2006)). Congress viewed 
these laws and others as part of an accelerating trend of legislation protecting the civil rights of 
people with disabilities. See Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 387, 387–90 (1991) (article describing this trend, written by 
former senator instrumental in passage of ADA). 
 121. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 13, at 527–28 (“Without broad public support or a strong 
social movement pushing to expand our notion of disabilities, it was simply too much to expect the 
Supreme Court to interpret the ADA expansively, or even to construe the statute consistent with 
congressional intent so long as the statute provided interpretive room for judicial discretion, which 
it did.”); Stein, supra note 3, at 626 (“Unlike other marginalized minority groups, disabled 
Americans were empowered by civil rights legislation prior to a general elevation of social 
consciousness about their circumstances and capabilities.”). Stein notes that organizing in the 
period before the ADA tended to be along disability-category lines and that it has been a challenge 
to sustain cross-disability organizational efforts in the period after passage. Id. at 627–28. It should 
also be noted that Selmi’s point is directed specifically at definitions of disability and who is 
covered by the ADA. Selmi, supra note 13, at 527. The organization of disability activists by 
impairment category posed difficulties for responding to judicial restrictions on the coverage of the 
law. 
 122. See Malhotra, supra note 113. 
 123. See id. at 70–71 (describing repeated disruptions of meetings of American Public Transit 
Association by disability rights demonstrators and additional public transit activism). 
 124. Moreover, when these sources talk of an underdeveloped social movement, they are 
usually trying to explain courts’ restrictive interpretations of the ADA. The reality is that even laws 
born out of social movements that are thought to have been more visible or more militant also suffer 
limiting interpretations from courts. This observation has been made time and again by legal 
scholars, notably those in the field of labor law. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization 
of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 
265, 268–69 (1978) (describing limiting construction placed on labor law by courts); James Gray 
Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 
519 (2004) (noting that in interpreting labor law, courts elevate common law rights of employers 
over statutory rights of workers). Judicial conduct is a weak indicator of the strength of the social 
movement behind laws. 
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F.  Distilling a Meaning 
The ADA’s text, its history, its agency interpretation, and its social 
context establish three central ideas about the duty to accommodate: that 
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are not separate ideas, but 
instead, undue hardship is the limit on reasonable accommodation, its flip 
side; that the duty is significant, not subject to cost-benefits balancing, but 
subject to ratcheting up over time; and that neutral rules are not immune to 
accommodation, but instead accommodation works as a form of 
preference, though one that should not be mislabeled “affirmative action.” 
1.  Two Sides of the Same Coin 
The legislative sources make clear that reasonable accommodation and 
undue hardship are a single concept. The words form parts of a statutory 
sentence that links them together into the same statutory term. The duty to 
make reasonable accommodations exists up to the limit of undue hardship. 
At the point of undue hardship, the accommodation is no longer 
reasonable. It should be no surprise that the ADA merely gives examples 
of reasonable accommodation while providing a definition and relevant 
factors to consider in determining undue hardship. If undue hardship can 
be determined, there is no need to define what reasonable accommodation 
is. It is everything that is not undue hardship.125 Undue hardship is the 
laboring phrase in the term, not reasonable accommodation. If 
“unreasonable accommodation” seems not to make sense, it is because 
reasonable accommodation lacks a meaning other than the absence of 
undue hardship. The terms should be read together, and the opposite of the 
one is the other. Hence the play on words to make the title of this article: 
There is no such thing as unreasonable accommodation or due hardship.126 
                                                                                                                     
 125. Many scholars also note that accommodations are reasonable precisely up to the point 
where they impose undue hardship, thus implicitly recognizing that the two concepts are one. S e, 
e.g., Stein, supra note 70, at 81 (“Title I delineates the boundary between reasonable and 
unreasonable as an otherwise undefined point at which a requested accommodation engenders an 
‘undue hardship’ to the providing employer.”); Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, R asonable 
Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before 
Hardship Turns Undue?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1311, 1316 (1991) (describing undue hardship as 
reasonable accommodation’s “twin concept”). Professor Basas makes the point that for true equality 
to be achieved, it is necessary to mount resistance against the emphasis on reasonableness of 
accommodations. Basas, supra note 96, at 105. She states, “Resistance demands dropping the 
language of reasonableness, or at least, shifting attention from gut reactions about reasonableness to 
more detailed analyses of hardship.” Id.  
 126. I acknowledge that I used “unreasonable accommodation” to mean something different in 
an article a dozen years ago. Mark C. Weber, B yond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A 
National Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 166 (1998). Trying 
to sound ironic, I used the term then to describe a duty of accommodation greater than ordinary 
reasonable accommodation. Under federal law, such a duty applies to the federal government and 
federal contractors. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 791(b), 793(a) (West 2010). In the article, I argued that it 
should be expanded to cover a wider range of employers and further enhanced. But like big hair, 
irony went out with the 1990s, and the usage never caught on. The phrase, however, has enough 
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A strict textualist might nevertheless complain that this interpretation 
reads “reasonable” out of the statute. But the words “reasonable” and 
“undue” are antonyms; reasonable accommodation and undue hardship 
represent opposites of each other, two poles of a single line. The rest of the 
statutory text reinforces the interpretation of reasonable and undue as 
opposites: reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are linked in the 
same sentence separated by an “unless,” denoting that an accommodation 
is reasonable unless it produces undue hardship.127 The structure of the 
statute as a whole lends further support. There is no definition of 
reasonable accommodation, but an elaborate one is provided for undue 
hardship.128 The fact that the statute places the burden of demonstrating 
undue hardship on the employer also presents a problem with the separate-
terms reading.129 Congress would not have intended the plaintiff to have 
the burden on an undefined reasonableness inquiry when it specified that 
the employer has the burden on its better-defined opposite. Moreover, as 
developed below, similar language in other parts of the ADA regarding 
reasonableness and burdensomeness of accommodation has been 
interpreted as two sides of the same coin.130 Even rigid textualists rely on 
constructions of similar language in the same statute.131 
At the very least, the “reasonable” term is ambiguous, and in that case, 
looking to the legislative history and regulatory agency interpretation is 
appropriate. The legislative history repeatedly refers to undue hardship as 
the limit of reasonable accommodation rather than a separate concept,132 
and manifests the intention to adopt interpretations of section 504 that treat 
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship as two sides of the same 
coin.133 The original EEOC Enforcement Guidance states in boldface type: 
                                                                                                                     
power to arrest attention that it seems foolish to let it lie unused. 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (“not making reasonable accommodations . . . unless 
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship . . . .”). 
 128. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9), (10) (2006). 
 129. See § 12112(b)(5)(A) (“not making reasonable accommodations . . . unless such covered 
entity can demonstrate hat the accommodation would impose an undue hardship . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
 130. See infra text accompanying notes 237–65 (discussing interpretations of ADA Titles II 
and III). 
 131. See infra text accompanying note 265 (discussing textualist use of interpretation of 
similar statutory language). 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 52–53 (discussing legislative history). 
133. Even some sources that ultimately adopt other conclusions about the meaning of 
reasonable accommodation nevertheless agree that the legislative history supports the same-coin 
interpretation: 
[T]here are intimations in the legislative history suggesting that some in Congress 
may have viewed “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” as opposite 
sides of the same coin. Though the statutory terms seem to be quite different, it is 
noteworthy that the passage in the House Report on the ADA that purports to 
explain “reasonable accommodation” ends up discussing the employer’s burden of 
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“The only statutory limitation on an employer’s obligation to provide 
‘reasonable accommodation’ is that no such change or modification is 
required if it would cause ‘undue hardship’ on the employer.”134 If a 
textualist reading somehow calls for a contrary interpretation, it should be 
rejected in favor of an intentionalist approach that takes this evidence of 
meaning into account. 
2.  A Significant Duty, Not a Cost-Benefits Balance, and a 
Dynamic Obligation 
The statutory accommodation burden is a substantial one. “Hardship” 
means something onerous. Moreover, the examples in the statutory text of 
reasonable accommodation—making facilities accessible, restructuring 
jobs, acquiring equipment, and hiring new personnel—entail effort and 
cost. The legislative history reinforces this reading. Accommodations 
might be “expensive”135 and plainly will disrupt routines and standard 
operating procedures. Changing standard operating procedures is the gist of 
accommodation and the dominant theme in the EEOC regulations 
concerning the statutory term.136  
The statutory term requires balancing of accommodations’ costs, but it 
is a balance with the overall and site-specific resources of the employer, 
not with the benefit to the employee nor with anything else.137 Provision of 
a reader for a blind public aid caseworker138 or an aide for a blind 
schoolteacher139 or a personal attendant for an employee140 could well fail 
an abstract cost-benefit test, but those are accommodations Congress 
                                                                                                                     
proving undue hardship. See H.R. Rep. No. 485(III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 39–42 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 462–65. It is also relevant that the 
statutory definition of “undue hardship” permits the employer to sustain its 
burden, with respect to its affirmative defense, with evidence as to the hardship for 
both employers generally and the particular employer being sued. 
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 148 (2d Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring); 
see infra text accompanying notes 162–69 (discussing Borkowski’s interpretation of reasonable 
accommodation); see also Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 733 
(D. Md. 1996) (adopting different interpretation but stating, “A number of courts treat ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ and ‘undue hardship’ as flip sides of the same coin, i.e., an accommodation which 
is reasonable does not cause an undue hardship, and an accommodation which would cause an 
undue hardship would, by definition, be unreasonable.”). 
 134. 1999 EEOC Reasonable Accommodation Guidance, supranote 95, at 3. 
 135. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 315. 
 136. See supra text accompanying note 86 (discussing EEOC regulations). As Professor Ani 
Satz points out, both legal and philosophical arguments support requiring employers to make 
accommodations that enable people with disabilities to accomplish work tasks in unorthodox 
manners, even if the employer would prefer accommodations that are more conventional, as with 
allowing an office worker to use her feet to manipulate objects rather than arm prostheses if that is 
easier for her. Satz, supra note 8, at 266. 
 137. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2006). 
 138. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 41 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 464. 
 139. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 67, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350. 
 140. Id. at 64, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 346. 
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specifically approved.141 Required accommodations might be those needed 
to get to work, not just those on the worksite.142 The reasonable 
accommodation-undue hardship determination entails close attention to the 
specific facts about particular employees or applicants and workplaces.143 
More will be expected of wealthier or larger employers.144 This fact alone 
means that precedent about one employer being excused from providing an 
accommodation should not be used to permit another employer, which may 
have more resources or different needs, to deny the accommodation. 
It also is clear that the burden should be viewed as dynamic, one that 
will change over time depending on what courts and juries consider 
appropriate as technology and social expectations change. If the social 
context of the statute has any significance at all, it is that accommodations 
that seemed beyond the pale yesterday will be considered ordinary 
tomorrow. As Professors Pamela S. Karlan and George Rutherglen noted, 
the accommodations determination process “resembles, in some important 
respects, the common-law process of developing and applying standards of 
negligence.”145 The use of juries is a particularly apt means to be certain 
that the law conforms to widespread understandings of what constitutes an 
undue hardship for an employer and that finders of fact will update that 
understanding as technology and social attitudes advance.146 
3.  A Preference, Not Neutrality, and Not Forbidden 
“Affirmative Action” 
The ADA’s challenge to neutral workplace rules is clear. 
Accommodations include variances from leave policies, scheduling 
policies, job assignment policies, training practices, shift arrangements, 
                                                                                                                     
 141. The statutory text specifically lists “qualified readers or interpreters” as mandatory 
accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2006). 
 142. See supra text accompanying note 51. 
 143. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (noting that ADA requires 
case-by-case determinations); Issacharoff & Nelson, upra note 8, at 337 (“[A]llowing cases to 
proceed to the reasonable accommodation inquiry pushes inexorably toward the fact-intensive case-
by-case analysis.”). 
 144. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2006); see also supra text accompanying notes 92–93 
(discussing EEOC Guidance). 
 145. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 31; see id. at 32 (“More broadly, the substantive 
standard for reasonable accommodation, the wide range of factors that are relevant to the issue of 
undue hardship, and the procedures for enforcement through individual claims in court, all suggest 
an analogy to the law of negligence.”). But see id. at 32 (noting that reasonable accommodation, 
unlike negligence, “requires more than efficient reductions of risk”); ee also Issacharoff & Nelson, 
supra note 8, at 352 (asserting that courts are less suited to develop standards for reasonable 
accommodation than for tort law); cf. Stewart Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable 
Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 1197, 1268–71 (2003) 
(comparing balancing of risks and burdens in negligence determinations to reasonable 
accommodation costs and benefits). 
 146. Juries came into ADA proceedings not in the original law but in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a(a)(2), (c) (2006)). 
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and practices regarding assignment of aides and helpers. All of those are 
neutral workplace rules. The fact that work policies and practices are also 
subject to attack under an adverse-impact test reinforces the conclusion 
that neutral rules are not sacrosanct.147 The reasonable accommodation 
duty thus constitutes a special preference to be given to workers who have 
disabilities that does not apply to others. But it is hardly an unfair 
preference. It removes the barriers that currently exist to the full 
participation of people with disabilities in employment. 
By the time of passage of the ADA, the Supreme Court had cleared up 
whatever confusion it caused by using the term “affirmative action” in 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis.148 The Court established that 
the limit of the accommodation duty under section 504 was fundamental 
alteration of the relevant program. The ADA’s legislative history buttresses 
that understanding by ignoring Davis and eschewing any use of affirmative 
action language.149 
II.   HOW THE FEDERAL COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP 
Both the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court have had the 
opportunity to interpret reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. 
Their interpretations, however, have not been completely faithful to 
Congress’s intentions.  
A.  The Lower Courts 
There are two leading courts of appeals cases on reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship. These deserve explication. Other 
lower court cases may be analyzed by looking at those rejecting 
accommodation claims and those permitting the claims to go to trial. 
1.  Two Leading Cases 
The most prominent courts of appeals cases concerning reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship are Vande Zande v. Wisconsin 
Department of Administration150 and Borkowski v. Valley Central School 
District.151 
                                                                                                                     
 147. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2006). 
 148. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). 
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 76–82 (discussing Davis). 
 150. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.). 
 151. 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J.). Perhaps because they are written by two 
prominent former law professors associated with different wings of the law and economics 
movement, the cases are remarkably good tools for demonstrating differing approaches to 
reasonable accommodation. Accordingly, they feature as major cases in past editions of a leading 
disability law casebook. RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 161 (Vande 
Zande), 169 (Borkowski) (6th ed. 2007). The seventh edition (2009) drops Borkowski while 
retaining Vande Zande, despite Borkowski’s validation in US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 
(2002) (citing Borkowski with approval) and the rejection of Vande Zande’s approach in that case. 
See infra text accompanying notes 195–226 (discussing Barnett’s interpretation of reasonable 
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Vande Zande involved a state employee with paraplegia.152 She used a 
wheelchair for mobility and thus was vulnerable to pressure ulcers, a 
condition that periodically required her to stay home for several weeks to 
permit the sores to heal.153 Although the employer made some 
accommodations,154 it refused to provide her a computer so she could work 
at home when she was experiencing pressure ulcers and to lower the sink 
in the office kitchenette so that she could use it when at work rather than 
having to use the sink in the women’s room.155 In discussing the 
accommodation duty, the court declared that the term “reasonable” in 
“reasonable accommodation” requires a cost-benefit analysis, by which “at 
the very least, the cost could not be disproportionate to the benefit.”156 
Applying this idea, the court ruled that a reasonable jury could not call 
working from home a reasonable accommodation except in “a very 
extraordinary case”157 and that allowing the plaintiff to work at home 
subject only to a slight loss of sick leave that might never be needed was 
“reasonable as a matter of law.”158 Even though lowering the sink would 
cost only about $150,159 the court said that step was as a matter of law not a 
reasonable accommodation given that the plaintiff could use the sink in the 
bathroom.160 The court affirmed a grant of summary judgment without ever 
                                                                                                                     
accommodation). Professor Stein makes extensive use of the pair in his article on the economic 
analysis of accommodation requirements. Stein, supra note 70, at 97–103. Other sources also 
juxtapose the cases. See, e.g., MARK C. WEBER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY LAW 65–69 (2007); 
Emens, supra note 65, at 869–74. 
 152. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543–44. 
 153. Id. at 543–44. 
 154. The court lists these as modifications to the bathrooms and addition of a ramp over a step, 
some adjustable furniture, paying for half the cost of a cot needed for personal care, schedule 
adjustments to permit medical appointments, and changes to plans for a locker room in a new 
building. Id. at 544. 
 155. Id. In the alternative, Vande Zande asked that she not be required to use 16.5 hours of 
sick leave, time she could not work because she lacked home computer equipment. Id. 
 156. Id. The court said that the employee must show that an accommodation is reasonable in 
both the sense of it being effective and of being proportional to the costs; the court added that the 
employer may then respond by proving that “upon more careful consideration the costs are 
excessive in relation either to the benefits of the accommodation or to the employer’s financial 
survival or health.” Id. at 543. 
 157. The court asserted that most jobs in organizations cannot be performed alone and without 
supervision without a substantial loss of productivity, although that “will no doubt change as 
communications technology advances.” Id. at 544.  
 158. Id. at 545. 
 159. The $150 amount was for moving the sink on the floor on which plaintiff worked, but 
even moving all the sinks in the building’s kitchenettes would have cost less than $2,000 and would 
have benefited others as well. See id. at 546. 
 160. The opinion stated: “[W]e do not think an employer has a duty to expend even modest 
amounts of money to bring about an absolute identity in working conditions between disabled and 
nondisabled workers.” Id. The argument that being forced to use the bathroom rather than the 
kitchen was stigmatizing was rejected on the assertion that stigma “is merely an epithet.” Id. As 
Professor Sunstein points out, the court did not even employ a meaningful cost-benefit analysis in 
rejecting the accommodation. See Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1902–03 (“Surely it was an 
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reaching the issue of undue hardship.161 
In Borkowski, the plaintiff was an elementary school library class 
teacher who had sustained neurological injuries in an auto accident fifteen 
years before becoming employed by the school district.162 The trauma 
caused her difficulties with memory and concentration, and diminished her 
balance, coordination, and mobility.163 She was denied tenure and resigned 
after the principal visited her class and found poor classroom management, 
criticizing her for remaining seated during the library class lesson and 
reporting that students made noise without being corrected.164 
Apparently, Borkowski recognized the practice of courts to treat 
reasonable accommodation as separate from undue hardship, for she 
divided the two concepts and argued that the employee’s burden on the 
accommodation issue had to be slight in order to give effect to the 
congressional intention that defendants bear the burden of proof on undue 
hardship.165 Placing stringent requirements on the plaintiff at the 
reasonable accommodation stage, as Vande Zande did, would effectively 
shift the burden to plaintiff on the question of the difficulty of providing 
the accommodation even though the statute says that the defendant bears 
the burden on undue hardship.166 The Borkowski court vacated the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the school district, reasoning that an 
employee bears only a burden of production on whether an accommodation 
is reasonable and declaring that although the question involves a cost-
benefits determination, the burden is light: “It is enough for the plaintiff to 
suggest the existence of a plausible accommodation, the costs of which, 
facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits.”167 Then, the risk of 
nonpersuasion falls on the defendant, and the burden of persuasion on 
reasonable accommodation “merges” with the defendant’s “burden of 
showing, as an affirmative defense, that the proposed accommodation 
would cause it to suffer an undue hardship.”168 Although the court thus 
split reasonable accommodation from undue hardship and made them 
separate burdens, it acknowledged that, “[I]n practice[,] meeting the 
burden of nonpersuasion on the reasonableness of the accommodation and 
demonstrating that the accommodation imposes an undue hardship amount 
                                                                                                                     
inconvenience to Vande Zande, at best, to have to go to the bathroom when she wanted to use the 
kitchenette. Surely it was unpleasant, and possibly much worse, to be excluded in this 
way . . . . Why was the loss to Vande Zande worth less than $150 . . . ?”).  
 161. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 546. 
 162. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. at 140–43 (discussing concepts of undue hardship and reasonable 
accommodation). 
 166. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (2006) (outlawing “not making reasonable 
accommodations . . . unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity”). 
 167. Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 138. 
 168. Id. 
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to the same thing.”169  
2.  Cases Restricting Accommodation 
Many federal court decisions limit the accommodation duty, for 
example, by restricting the applicability of the accommodation of 
reassigning to a vacant position a qualified employee who can no longer do 
his or her current job because of disability. Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
held that Wal-Mart did not need to offer a grocery order filler who was 
injured on the job and could no longer do her required duties a new 
position as a router, which was a vacant job she could perform despite her 
incapacitated right arm and hand.170 Wal-Mart instead could hire an 
applicant with higher qualifications.171 The court declared that, “Huber was 
treated exactly as all other candidates were treated for the Wal-Mart job 
opening, no worse and no better.”172 The court never identified any 
hardship imposed on Wal-Mart, much less an undue one. In a similar case, 
EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., Judge Richard Posner rejected the idea 
of giving preference to qualified but, in the opinion of the employer, 
“inferior” applicants who have disabilities and are transferring from jobs 
they can no longer perform, calling it “affirmative action with a 
vengeance,” a form of preference not required by the statute.173  
                                                                                                                     
 169. Id. The concurrence noted that more than one court had interpreted the Rehabilitation Act 
in that manner. See id. at 145 (Newman, C.J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 
54–60 (discussing precedent under section 504 of Rehabilitation Act). The court found that an issue 
of fact existed whether the provision of a teacher’s aide to help maintain order in the class would be 
a reasonable accommodation. Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 141–43 (majority opinion). 
 170. 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. dismissed, 552 U.S. 1136 (2008). 
 171. Id. at 484. The parties stipulated that the individual who received the job was the most 
qualified candidate, although the opinion gives no indication what qualifications made the 
candidate superior to Huber. See id. at 481. 
 172. Id. at 484. 
 173. 227 F.3d 1024, 1028–29 (7th Cir. 2000). Other cases restrict the availability of 
reassignment accommodations. E.g., King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting transfer on ground that plaintiff was not most qualified applicant); Bellino v. Peters, 530 
F.3d 543, 550 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that offer of transfer to lower paid position was reasonable 
accommodation as matter of law); Filar v. Bd. of Educ., 526 F.3d 1054, 1067–68 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(refusing to require employer to reassign employee to single work location when others in job 
category had roving locations); Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., 222 F.3d 247, 258 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(upholding failure to reassign on ground that employee failed to complete request for transfer form 
for each job employee might have obtained); Allen v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 622–
23 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment against employee on ground that transfer to lower-
paying position constituted reasonable accommodation even though employee argued that equal-
paying positions for which he held qualifications were available); Schmidt v. Methodist Hosp. of 
Ind., Inc., 89 F.3d 342, 344–45 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment against employee 
who wished to transfer to other position while still in probationary period contrary to employer 
policy, when employer offered choice of additional training in existing job or resignation and 
reapplication for other job); Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 801–02 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(affirming summary judgment against employee who requested transfer away from noisy 
environment that exacerbated migraine headaches when employer offered leave time instead); 
Micari v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 275, 282–83 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying that 
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Not every court has followed this approach. The District of Columbia 
Circuit in Aka v. Washington Hospital Center pointed out that a preference 
is required for the employee who can no longer do the current job and 
wants to transfer to a vacant position:  
[T]he word “reassign” must mean more than allowing an 
employee to apply for a job on the same basis as anyone else. 
An employee who on his own initiative applies for and 
obtains a job elsewhere in the enterprise would not be 
described as having been “reassigned”; the core word 
“assign” implies some active effort on the part of the 
employer.174 
Various other courts follow Aka’s approach.175 
                                                                                                                     
employer may have obligation to transfer employee with disability to another position); Parisi v. 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 995 F. Supp. 298, 303 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (same). 
 174. 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). Discussing the legislative history of the 
provision, the court stated: 
Had Congress intended that disabled employees be treated exactly like other job 
applicants, there would have been no need for the report to go on to explain that 
“‘bumping’ another employee out of a position to create a vacancy is not 
required,” and that “if a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for 
employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in 
determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with 
a disability without seniority to the job” . . . ; there would have been no danger 
that an employee would be “bumped,” or that a job would go to a disabled 
employee with less seniority. 
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345). 
 175. See id. (“Numerous courts have assumed that the reassignment obligation means 
something more than treating a disabled employee like any other job applicant.”) (collecting cases); 
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164–65 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“[I]f the 
reassignment language merely requires employers to consider on an equal basis with all other 
applicants an otherwise qualified existing employee with a disability for reassignment to a vacant 
position, that language would add nothing to the obligation not to discriminate, and would thereby 
be redundant . . . .”). For an illuminating discussion of these cases, see Anderson, supra ote 36, at 
9–11 (emphasizing distinction between ADA’s reasonable accommodation obligation and Title 
VII’s equal treatment orientation). Additional decisions articulate robust views of the duty to 
reassign. E.g., Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 372–74 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding jury 
verdict in favor of employee with severe depression and insomnia who requested transfer to day 
shift position); Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 1999) (Sotomayor, 
C.J.) (“[T]he law is clear that an offer of an inferior position does not constitute a reasonable 
accommodation where a position with salary and benefits comparable to those of the employee’s 
former job is available.”); cf. Vollmert v. Wisc. Dep’t of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 298–302 (7th Cir. 
1999) (overturning summary judgment for employer on ground that additional training for dyslexic 
employee could constitute reasonable accommodation and that offer of transfer to position without 
same opportunities for advancement did not discharge duty to accommodate employee); Davoll v. 
Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1126, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding claims of police officers seeking 
transfers to non-police city positions, contrary to city policy). 
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Additional decisions reject requests for the accommodation of job 
restructuring when the effect is to assign the worker permanently to light 
duty or to create a new position for the employee, even when the employer 
makes no showing of undue hardship.176 Still other cases reject 
accommodation requests that relate to getting to work, such as shift 
changes due to transportation problems, distinguishing these proposed 
rules modifications from accommodations that relate to what happens 
inside the workplace.177 Courts have refused to require employers to permit 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Watson v. Lithonia Lighting, 304 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding employer’s 
failure to provide permanent light-duty position); Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1133 (10th Cir. 
1999) (upholding refusal to assign light-duty posts to employees with long-term impairments), 
overruled in part on other grounds, Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); 
Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 689, 697 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding policy of 
forbidding employee with permanent restrictions from remaining in light-duty positions); Allen v. 
Ga. Power Co., 980 F. Supp. 470, 478 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that assignment to a permanent 
light duty position was not reasonable accommodation); Champ v. Baltimore County, 884 F. Supp. 
991, 999–1000 (D. Md. 1995) (holding that police officer need not be assigned to permanent light-
duty position); McDonald v. Kan. Dep’t of Corrs., 880 F. Supp. 1416, 1423 (D. Kan. 1995); see 
Dargis v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding refusal to move correctional 
officer to position without inmate contact when employer had practice of rotating officers through 
various positions); Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719, 729–30 (6th Cir. 
2000) (holding that employee’s proposed accommodation of permanent position in position that 
otherwise rotated among employees was not reasonable); England v. ENBI Ind., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 
2d 1002, 1014 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (upholding refusal to permit press operator to avoid use of one 
press and modify use of other, when employer had policy of rotating workers among different 
presses); see also Fedro v. Reno, 21 F.3d 1391, 1400 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding refusal to combine 
two part-time positions into full-time position in Rehabilitation Act case); Smith v. United Parcel 
Serv., 50 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (same in ADA case); cf. McBride v. BIC 
Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2009) (asserting that plaintiff lacked 
qualifications for vacant secretarial positions). 
 177. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 Yale L.J. 1, 37 (2004) 
(citing Wade v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 97-3378, 1998 WL 639162, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 
1998)). Wade, it may be noted, appears to rely more on the idea that difficulty in getting to work 
during darkness because of a vision problem does not constitute a substantial limit on the major life 
activity of working. See Wade, 1998 WL 639162, at *2. It is also true, as Bagenstos points out, that 
some courts have been open to the possibility of requiring accommodations that facilitate getting to 
work. See Bagenstos, supra; see also Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 498, 504, 508 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (overturning summary judgment on claim for day shift for clerk with visual impairment 
who could not drive at night, declaring, “[W]e hold as a matter of law that changing Colwell’s 
working schedule to day shifts in order to alleviate her disability-related difficulties in getting to 
work is a type of accommodation that the ADA contemplates.”); Lyon v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 
1512, 1513–14, 1517 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that financial assistance for parking may be 
reasonable accommodation). Other courts, however, have not. See, e.g., Filar v. Bd. of Educ., 526 
F.3d 1054, 1066 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that school district need not assign teacher to single 
school within walking distance of public transportation as accommodation for teacher’s arthritis 
condition); Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1364, 1366–67 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) 
(rejecting accommodation of flexible schedule for worker with obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
reasoning that punctuality constituted essential function of job). Professor Carrie Basas concludes, 
“[Cases involving] accommodations related to getting to work . . . demonstrate the spirit by which 
‘reasonable’ has been applied thus far: as an imprecise, bias-laden, pro-employer conduit for 
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employees to work from home,178 even though this would be a reasonable 
accommodation for many jobs and perhaps the most logical response to the 
difficulties people with disabilities have in using existing transportation 
options.179 A court refused to send to the jury a case in which an employee 
with a mental impairment requested a transfer away from supervisors who 
imposed undue stress on her, deeming it not a reasonable accommodation 
and an undue hardship per se.180 Another held that assigning a long-term 
job coach is not a reasonable accommodation.181 A court rejected as a 
matter of law a request for a part-time work schedule,182 ven though part-
time and modified schedules are an accommodation listed in the ADA 
itself.183 A court has held that hiring a “helper” to do some aspects of a job 
                                                                                                                     
attitudinal barriers and misconceptions about disability.” Basas, supra note 96, at 64. 
 178. See, e.g., Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 58 (1st Cir. 2001); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 
530 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (applying Rehabilitation Act); see also Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 
539, 547–48 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e note that as a general matter, working at home is not a 
reasonable accommodation.”). But see Langon v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 
1061–62 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (overturning undue hardship ruling in Rehabilitation Act case involving 
working from home).  
 179. See Basas, supra note 96, at 86 (“Hurdles to arriving at work are magnified for employees 
with disabilities. Requests to work-at-home are often prompted by the difficulty of appearing at 
work, whether because the commute is particularly taxing, or because public transportation is 
inaccessible or unreliable.”). Basas notes that working at home can be an attractive accommodation 
for other reasons as well: “Often, the workplace is not a hospitable environment for building in 
breaks, taking medicine, or situating one’s body comfortably.” Id. 
 180. Wiggins v. DaVita Tidewater, LLC, 451 F. Supp. 2d 789, 804 (E.D. Va. 2006); see also 
Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F. 3d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 1996) (“In essence, Weiler asks us to 
allow her to establish the conditions of her employment, most notably, who will supervise her. 
Nothing in the ADA allows this shift in responsibility.”); Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 
F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that essential functions of job included working under 
assigned supervisor and, “[N]othing in the law leads us to conclude that in enacting the disability 
acts, Congress intended to interfere with personnel decisions within an organizational hierarchy.”); 
Kolpas v. G.D. Searle & Co., 959 F. Supp. 525, 530 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“It is not a reasonable 
accommodation for an employer to have to transfer an employee to a position under another 
supervisor.”). But see Kennedy v. Dresser Rand Co., 193 F.3d 120, 122–23 (2d Cir. 1999) (per 
curiam) (“[T]he question of whether a requested accommodation is a reasonable one must be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. . . . A per se rule stating that the replacement of a supervisor can 
never be a reasonable accommodation is therefore inconsistent with our ADA case law. There is a 
presumption, however, that a request to change supervisors is unreasonable . . . .”). 
 181. Kleiber v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 809, 822 (S.D. Ohio 2006) 
(semble), aff’d, 485 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 182. Treanor v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 200 F.3d 570, 575 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he ADA does 
not require an employer to create a new part-time position where none previously existed.”); Terrell 
v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir. 1998) (“In a specific situation, part-time employment may 
or may not be reasonable. In this case, where USAir had no part-time jobs when Plaintiff demanded 
such a position, a request for part-time employment was unreasonable.”); Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 28 
F. Supp. 2d 374, 379 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that allowing part-time employment would, inter 
alia, “alter the employment pattern universally imposed within the company”), aff’d, 33 Fed. App’x 
49 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 183. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2006). 
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is not a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law,184 despite the 
examples cited in the ADA legislative history of readers being required to 
be hired for blind public aid caseworkers and aides for blind teachers.185 
 3.  Cases Upholding Accommodations Claims 
Nonetheless, a number of courts view the accommodation obligation 
expansively and impose significant obligations to accommodate. One court 
overturned a grant of summary judgment to an employer when the 
employer denied an accommodation to an employee with epilepsy who 
could not drive in order to allow her to make bank deposits of store 
receipts without driving there herself.186 Another reversed summary 
judgment when an employer failed to afford the requested accommodation 
of specialized training to an employee with learning disabilities who had 
trouble mastering a new computer system.187 Still another held that 
summary judgment was improper when a mechanic who could no longer 
make repetitive motions with his left arm and shoulder contended that he 
could perform the essential functions of the job if it were restructured or 
that he could be assigned a position that may have been open for a 
recycling foreman.188 Yet another overturned summary judgment when a 
production inspector worker with a back impairment who could not work 
on more than one assembly line was denied an exemption from a rotation 
system.189 And a court of appeals ruled that the employer should not have 
been granted summary judgment when an employee who used a wheelchair 
                                                                                                                     
 184. Ricks v. Xerox Corp., 877 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (D. Kan. 1995) (“As to plaintiff’s final 
contention, the court does not believe that requiring Xerox to hire a ‘helper’ to assist him in 
performing the essential functions of any position would, as a matter of law, be a reasonable 
accommodation.”) (footnote omitted), aff’d, 96 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1996) (table); see also 
Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 161 F.3d 292, 295–96 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (affirming 
grant of summary judgment to employer on neurologist’s claim that employer had to hire 
administrative assistant for him as reasonable accommodation). 
 185. See Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 380 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff’d, 732 F.2d 146 
(3d Cir. 1984) (table); supra text accompanying notes 47, 69 (discussing legislative history). More 
than one court has approved the refusal of an employer bound by the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act 
to provide someone who can read to an employee unable to do so, despite the congressional 
approval of Nelson. Johnson v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 983 F. Supp. 1464, 1472–73 (N.D. Ga. 
1996) (food stamp caseworker in ADA case); DiPompo v. West Point Military Acad., 770 F. Supp. 
887, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (firefighter in Rehabilitation Act case). 
 186. Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The 
plaintiff suggested several ‘plausible accommodation[s]’ to enable her to be promoted at S-44, 
including having the manager of a nearby store drive her or hiring a car service or a driver at her 
own expense. The proposed accommodations are not, facially, an ‘undue hardship’ . . . .”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 187. Vollmert v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 301–02 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 188. Benson v. Nw. Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108, 1112–15 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 189. Turner v. Hershey Chocolate, 440 F.3d 604, 615 (3d Cir. 2006). The rotation system was 
adopted to decrease the risk of repetitive motion injuries, but the finder of fact could find that 
limiting the plaintiff’s participation would not interfere with rotations of other workers. Id. at 607, 
614. 
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and experienced problems clocking in on time requested as an 
accommodation a variance from a strict punctuality policy.190 District 
courts have denied employers’ motions for summary judgment with regard 
to requested accommodations that included extension of leave of absence 
beyond one year,191 moving an employee with mental illness to a day 
shift,192 providing a parent aide or other measures to enable a teacher with 
impaired speech to keep order in the classroom,193 and, though contrary to 
the majority position, long-term light duty work.194 
B.   The Supreme Court  
The only Supreme Court decision on reasonable accommodations under 
Title I of the ADA is US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.195 The case involved a 
cargo handler who injured his back and transferred under the company’s 
voluntary (not collectively bargained) seniority system to a less physically 
demanding position in the mailroom.196 He held that position for two years, 
but the job then became open to seniority-based bidding, and employees 
with greater seniority wanted it.197 Barnett asked that he be allowed to keep 
the position, making an exception to the ordinary operation of the seniority 
system as an accommodation for his disability.198 After five months of 
deliberation, US Airways said no, Barnett lost his job, and he sued under 
Title I of the ADA.199 The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendant, relying on the proposition that any exception to seniority would 
                                                                                                                     
 190. Holly v. Clairson Indus., 492 F.3d 1247, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he most that can be 
said for Clairson’s position is that a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether 
punctuality as defined by Clairson’s policy is an essential element of Holly’s job, and it was thus 
error for the district court to have taken this issue away from the fact-finder and awarded summary 
judgment to Clairson.”). The problems stemmed from, among other things, the time clock being 
blocked by furniture and the path to the clock being difficult to negotiate in a wheelchair because of 
various obstacles. Id. at 1250–51. Waiver of start-time policies may be required in other contexts as 
well. See Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., 209 F.3d 29, 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that for 
job that permitted starting times between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m., issue of fact existed whether plaintiff’s 
proposal that employer permit later start time constituted reasonable accommodation); see also
cases cited supra note 177 (permitting triers of fact to determine that additional accommodations to 
facilitate getting to work could be required). 
 191. Switala v. Schwan’s Sales Enter., 231 F. Supp. 2d 672, 687–88 (N.D. Ohio 2002); see 
also Velente-Hook v. E. Plumas Health Care, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (stating 
that employer was obliged to consider personal leave beyond set medical absence period while 
employee underwent chemotherapy). 
 192. Vera v. Williams Hospitality Group, 73 F. Supp. 2d 161, 169, 171 (D.P.R. 1999).  
 193. Olian v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F. Supp. 2d 953, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 194. Leslie v. St. Vincent New Hope, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 879, 888 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (stating that 
transfer to light duty position may be reasonable accommodation). 
 195. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 196. Id. at 394. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
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pose undue hardship.200 The Ninth Circuit reversed en banc, ruling that the 
seniority system should be only one factor in the undue hardship 
determination.201 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded.202 
Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion first rejected US Airways’ 
argument that because the ADA merely equalizes treatment of persons 
with disabilities, a disability-neutral rule such as job assignment under a 
seniority system should always prevail over a claim for accommodation.203 
The Court declared that the ADA requires preferences for people with 
disabilities in the form of accommodations to afford those who have 
disabling conditions with the same workplace opportunities as others: 
“[P]references will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act’s basic 
equal opportunity goal. The Act requires preferences in the form of 
‘reasonable accommodations’ that are needed for those with disabilities to 
obtain the same workplace opportunities that those without disabilities 
automatically enjoy.”204 Exceptions from neutral rules are prime examples 
of mandatory accommodations, such as job restructuring, modified work 
schedules, and provision of specialized equipment.205  
The Court then rejected Barnett’s view that reasonable accommodation 
means effective accommodation and that since the transfer was obviously 
an effective accommodation, the Court could move on to the undue 
hardship analysis.206 While not advancing the argument that reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship are two ends of a continuum or two 
sides of the same coin, Barnett had argued that placing any greater 
obligation on the plaintiff at the summary judgment phase than showing 
that the accommodation is reasonable in the sense of being effective would 
undermine the congressional intention of having the employer bear the 
burden of showing that the accommodation imposes undue hardship.207 
The Court took note of the “practical burden of proof dilemma” but said 
that “reasonable” does not mean “effective” in ordinary language, and that 
it should be a term separate and apart from undue hardship.208 The Court 
also noted that undue hardship is, under the statute, undue hardship on the 
operation of the business; according to the Court, an accommodation could 
be unreasonable on grounds other than effects on the operation of the 
business, for example, because of its effect on co-workers.209 The Court 
said that neither the statute nor any other congressional source indicated 
that reasonable means no more than effective.210 
                                                                                                                     
 200. Id. at 395. 
 201. Barnett v. US Airways, 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 202. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 406. 
 203. Id. at 397. 
 204. Id.; see also id. (“By definition any special ‘accommodation’ requires the employer to 
treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially.”). 
 205. See id. at 397–98 (discussing accommodations that entail departure from neutral rules). 
 206. Id. at 400. 
 207. Id. at 399–400. 
 208. Id. at 400. 
 209. Id. at 400–01. 
 210. Id. at 401. 
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Nevertheless, the majority opinion endorsed the approach taken by 
Judge Guido Calabresi in Borkowski that the way to give reasonable 
accommodation a separate meaning but not undermine the congressional 
assignment of the burden on undue hardship to the employer is to ask at 
summary judgment only whether the accommodation seems reasonable on 
its face, that is, ordinarily or in the run of cases.211 Once the plaintiff has 
shown the accommodation is reasonable on its face or in the run of cases, 
the defendant must then show “special (typically case-specific) 
circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular 
circumstances.”212 Thus, the Court gave an independent meaning to 
reasonable accommodation but one that made it an easy hurdle to 
surmount, and the Court made undue hardship the topic that would require 
careful, case-specific analysis. 
Applying this approach, the Court perhaps put somewhat sharper teeth 
into the reasonable accommodation requirement in seniority cases than 
others by saying that ordinarily an accommodation that violates a seniority 
system would not be reasonable, given the judicial deference to seniority 
systems in other contexts and the benefits to employees of consistent, 
uniformly administered seniority systems.213 Nevertheless, an employee 
remains free to show that an exception to seniority is reasonable on the 
facts of the case. The employee might show, for example, that frequent 
departures from the system have reduced employee expectations of 
consistent application or that there are enough exceptions to the system’s 
operation that one more will not matter.214 The case needed to be remanded 
for such a showing.215 
One may fault the Court for failing to recognize that reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship are two sides of the same coin, but its 
reading of reasonable accommodation as an easy burden to surmount216 
(apparently in all cases but those involving seniority)217 may practically be 
                                                                                                                     
 211. Id. at 401–02 (citing Borkowski v. Valley Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 212. Id. at 402. 
 213. Id. at 403–05. 
 214. Id. at 405. 
 215. Id. at 406. Two justices concurred. Justice John Paul Stevens joined the opinion but 
emphasized the many factual questions that remained open for determination on remand. Id. at 407–
08 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined the opinion in order to create a 
majority interpretation of the statute, though she expressed reservations about the Court’s test for 
ascertaining whether a job assignment that violates a seniority system is a reasonable 
accommodation. Id. at 408 (O’Connor, J., concurring). She preferred a test under which the effect 
of the seniority system on the reasonableness of a reassignment accommodation would depend on 
whether the seniority system is legally enforceable. Id. She noted, however, that the Court’s 
approach would often cause the same outcome. Id. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence 
Thomas, filed a dissenting opinion, id. at 411 (Scalia, J., dissenting), as did Justice David Souter, 
whose opinion was joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, id. at 420 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 216. Professor Anderson is more critical on this count, though she notes, “[T]he Court adopts 
what might appear to be a plaintiff-friendly standard of facial feasibility or plausibility.” Anderson, 
supra note 36, at 28. 
217. To afford this exalted protection to seniority, the Court had to ignore language in the 
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not too far off the mark.218 The Court followed congressional instructions 
by placing the emphasis on the undue hardship test, where the employer 
has the burden, but the Court did not have any occasion to discuss what 
level of hardship must occur before it becomes undue. The Court did not 
impose a cost-benefit analysis on reasonable accommodations, and in all 
but seniority system cases, it gave respect to the trier of fact by holding that 
even a weak showing of reasonableness—reasonable on its face or in the 
run of cases—will get the claimant past a motion for summary judgment. It 
would be more consistent with the correct interpretation of the statute, 
however, to approach the reasonable-in-the-run-of-cases test as a search for 
obvious examples of undue hardship, rather than an independent inquiry 
into reasonableness.219 
It may, of course, be argued that failure of Congress to overrule Barnett 
through new legislation constitutes a ratification of Barnett’s reading of the 
statute and a congressional retreat from the two-sides-of-the-same-coin 
interpretation. The Supreme Court frequently disregards such arguments,220 
though at times it relies on them.221 Even if the arguments might be 
persuasive in some cases, they are not so with regard to the meaning of 
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship in Title I of the ADA. The 
                                                                                                                     
ADA’s legislative history that, though it dealt directly with collectively bargained seniority, would 
appear to apply with greater force to a voluntary seniority system: “For example, if a collective 
bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given amount of seniority, it may 
be considered as a factor in determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an 
employee with a disability without seniority to the job. However, the agreement would not be 
determinative on the issue.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345. Justice Souter’s dissent relied heavily on this and similar legislative 
history, which strongly supports the Ninth Circuit’s position that seniority provisions, even those in 
a legally enforceable collective bargaining agreement, are simply a factor in connection with the 
reasonability of the reassignment accommodation. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 421 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
As Souter pointed out, statements in the ADA’s legislative history do not overrule legally 
enforceable labor contract provisions, but they surely demonstrate that Congress did not want to 
give greater weight than only-a-factor for seniority systems that are not even in a collective 
bargaining agreement. Id. at 422. Professor Befort believes that reassignment of an employee with a 
disability is an accommodation that “requires a greater degree of workplace reorganization and 
imposes extra burdens on both employers and fellow workers as compared to other types of 
accommodations.” Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions and Suggested Solutions After U.S. Airways, 
Inc. v. Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 945 (2003). Perhaps these considerations account for some of 
the resistance to the congressional command concerning reassignment. 
 218. Illustrating this point, even post-Barnett cases that overturn summary judgments against 
employees frequently jump from stating the reasonable accommodation duty to analyzing undue 
hardship. See, e.g., Ekstrad v. Sch. Dist. of Somerset, 583 F.3d 972, 977 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding no 
undue hardship in providing classroom with natural light to teacher with seasonal affective 
disorder). 
 219. My thanks to Professor Cheryl Anderson for this idea. 
 220. See, e.g., Monnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695–701 (1978) (overruling 
previous interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on rereading of relevant legislative history of 
statute passed in 1871). 
 221. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 & n.1 (1989), superseded 
by statute in part not relevant, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
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Supreme Court’s sole case dealing with those terms is bounded by the 
unique—perhaps peculiar—desire to insulate seniority systems from attack 
and is widely known only with regard to its holdings about reassignment 
under seniority systems.222 As noted below, the case is at odds with the 
Court’s interpretation of comparable terms in Titles II and III of the same 
statute.223 The ADA has not been reenacted in the years following Barnett, 
and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 embraced only a limited set of the 
most urgent corrections to judicial interpretations of the law, hardly 
constituting a comprehensive fix for the statute’s potential problems of 
judicial interpretation.224 Moreover, as emphasized above, it is only after 
more cases start to make it past the coverage phase of litigation that 
problems with judicial interpretation of reasonable accommodation and 
undue hardship are likely to become apparent.225 The need for a 
congressional correction is not yet obvious. 
Even if Barnett is unlikely to be overruled or disapproved in the near 
future, it should be read extremely narrowly as to the burden placed on 
claimants to show reasonableness of an accommodation: simply that there 
is no obvious undue hardship caused by the accommodation. This is hardly 
unrealistic. Barnett’s language suggests that in all but seniority system 
cases the claimant’s burden should be light.226 Courts should be 
encouraged to think of the reasonableness step as unnecessary altogether. 
As Professors Karlan and Rutherglen declared half a decade before 
Barnett, “Although . . . it would technically be possible for an 
accommodation both to be reasonable and to be unduly burdensome, as a 
practical matter the two concepts operate in tandem.” 227 They noted, 
“[C]ourts that find a particular accommodation to be ‘reasonable’ are 
unlikely to exempt employers from undertaking it, and courts that find a 
particular accommodation to impose an ‘undue hardship’ are 
correspondingly unlikely to demand that an employer shoulder it.”228 
The Court’s decision firmly rejected the position taken in Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s dissent that the ADA’s accommodation duty requires only 
“the suspension (within reason) of those employment rules and practices 
that the employee’s disability prevents him from observing.”229 Scalia said 
                                                                                                                     
 222. This fact is well demonstrated by the reassignment-specific nature of the academic 
commentary. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 12, 89, 217 (articles discussing Barnett). 
 223. See infra text accompanying notes 238–50 (Title III), 251–60 (Title II), 261–64 (both). 
 224. See Long, supra note 8 (noting that ADAAA focuses on definition of disability, reacting 
to judicial interpretations on that topic); see also Travis, supra note 10, at 320 (“[T]he ADAAA was 
driven by a coalition of disability rights activists, shepherded through Congress by a few personally 
interested members, and received little media attention.”).  
 225. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 10. 
 226. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401–02 (discussing with approval lower 
courts’ holdings that “a plaintiff/employee (to defeat a defendant/employer’s motion for summary 
judgment) need only show that an ‘accommodation’ seems reasonable on its face, .e., ordinarily or 
in the run of cases”). 
 227. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 11. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 412 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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it was a mistake to interpret the ADA, as the Court did, to make “all 
employment rules and practices—even those which (like a seniority 
system) pose no distinctive obstacle to the disabled—subject to suspension 
when that is (in a court’s view) a ‘reasonable’ means of enabling a disabled 
employee to keep his job.”230 For Scalia, no exemption should be required 
with regard to neutral rules that “bear no more heavily upon the disabled 
employee than upon others,” such as “a seniority system, which burdens 
the disabled and nondisabled alike.”231 According to Scalia, “When one 
departs from this understanding, the ADA’s accommodation provision 
becomes a standardless grab bag–leaving it to the courts to decide which 
workplace preferences (higher salary, longer vacations, reassignment to 
positions to which others are entitled) can be deemed ‘reasonable’ to 
‘make up for’ the particular employee’s disability.”232 Justice Scalia relied 
heavily233 on EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.234 and similar opinions, 
such as the dissent in Aka.235  
The majority firmly rejected Scalia’s argument, identifying its 
fundamental error: There is no valid analytic distinction between a 
seniority system or other neutral employment rule that imposes a difficulty 
on an employee with a disability because the employee can do no other job 
and a neutral rule such as an office assignment policy that imposes a 
difficulty on an employee with a disability because the employee cannot 
use a particular work station.236 The statute draws no such distinction, and 
there is no basis to impose one by judicial fiat. 
III.   RESTORING THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP 
The judicial interpretations of the accommodation duty do not match 
congressional intentions. Nevertheless, there is ample authority to rely on 
in correcting the interpretation of the reasonable accommodation-undue 
hardship provision. These sources buttress the conclusion that reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship are the same concept rather than two 
separate hurdles for claimants, that the burden on employers is substantial, 
and that required accommodations frequently require departures from 
                                                                                                                     
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 413. 
 232. Id. at 413–14. 
 233. Id. at 416–17. 
 234. 227 F.3d 1024, 1028–29 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussed upratext accompanying note 173). 
 235. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1314–15 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (discussed 
supra text accompanying note 174). 
 236. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397 (“By definition any special ‘accommodation’ requires the 
employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially. And the fact that the 
difference in treatment violates an employer’s disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the 
accommodation beyond the Act’s potential reach.”); id. at 397–98 (“Neutral office assignment rules 
would automatically prevent the accommodation of an employee whose disability-imposed 
limitations require him to work on the ground floor. . . . Neutral furniture budget rules would 
automatically prevent the accommodation of an individual who needs a different kind of chair or 
desk.”). 
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neutral employer policies. 
A.  Two Sides of the Same Coin 
The statute itself and its legislative history are the best sources on the 
proposition that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are two 
ends of the same concept, two sides of the same coin. This interpretation, 
however, is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
comparable terms of other titles of the ADA and with the interpretations of 
courts other than the federal judiciary interpreting similar statutes. 
1.  Looking to Interpretations of Analogous Terms in the ADA 
The decisions with respect to reasonable accommodation in 
employment—even Barnett, which is more “accommodating” than those of 
many lower courts—are out of sync with those in other areas. Title III of 
the ADA applies to places of public accommodation, such as stores, 
restaurants, movie theaters, and offices open to the public.237 The language 
of what it requires of entities that operate those places is not precisely the 
same as that of Title I, but it is closely comparable. Title III requires 
providers of public accommodations to make reasonable modifications in 
their policies (the analogue of reasonable accommodation) unless the 
provider can show the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature 
of the public accommodation (the analogue of undue hardship).238 
The key Supreme Court case on reasonable modification in places of 
public accommodation is Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.,239 a well-known 
decision involving professional golfer Casey Martin, whose degenerative 
leg disease prevented him from playing without the use of a golf cart. 
Professional golfers normally enter the PGA tour circuit by submitting 
letters of recommendation and paying a fee to compete in a qualifying 
tournament called the Q-School. Golf carts are permitted during the first 
two rounds of the Q-School, but all competitors must walk in the final one, 
and the PGA refused Martin’s request that he be provided the 
accommodation of a waiver of the no-carts rule. Martin sued under Title III 
of the ADA. 
The Supreme Court upheld an injunction that Martin be permitted to 
use a cart. After determining that the tour was in fact a public 
accommodation,240 the Court held that waiving the requirement that golfers 
walk the course is not a modification of practices that would fundamentally 
alter the nature of the PGA tournaments. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote 
in the majority opinion that the waiver was a reasonable modification, 
stating that the PGA admitted that using a cart was necessary for Martin to 
                                                                                                                     
 237. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 (2006). 
 238. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). See generally Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State 
and Local Government: The Relationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title 
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 1089, 1118–32 (comparing 
duties under various ADA titles and section 504 of Rehabilitation Act). 
 239. 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
 240. Id. at 671–72, 677. 
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play without suffering incapacitating injury.241 “Martin’s claim thus differs 
from one that might be asserted by players with less serious afflictions that 
make walking the course uncomfortable or difficult, but not beyond their 
capacity.”242 In that instance, “[A]n accommodation might be reasonable 
but not necessary.”243 In this instance, however, “the narrow dispute” was 
whether waiver of the walking rule would fundamentally alter the nature of 
the tournament.244 The Court thus treated reasonable modification and 
fundamental alteration as one term, two sides of the same coin. 
On the question whether use of a cart rather than walking constitutes a 
fundamental alteration of the nature of the enterprise, Justice Stevens 
reasoned in his majority opinion that modifications of rules might be 
fundamental alterations if they 1) altered an essential aspect of the game, 
such as the diameter of the hole, so that the modification would be 
unacceptable even if all players were affected equally, or 2) made a less 
significant change with a minor impact, but one that would give the 
recipient of the modification a competitive advantage.245 The first element 
did not apply because the essence of golf is making shots rather than 
walking, even when golf is played at the highest levels.246 The Court 
deemed any effect on outcome to be insignificant given that competitors 
never play under precisely identical conditions and that the effects of 
fatigue from walking a golf course are usually minimal.247 Martin himself 
suffered far greater fatigue from walking to and from the cart than golfers 
without disabilities who walk the whole course.248 Justice Scalia, writing in 
dissent for himself and Justice Clarence Thomas, argued that the rules of 
all games are arbitrary and thus it makes no sense to deem one or another 
rule inessential.249 Moreover, the waiver of any rule could have an effect 
                                                                                                                     
 241. Id. at 682 (“Petitioner does not contest that a golf cart is a reasonable modification that is 
necessary if Martin is to play in its tournaments.”). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. Justice Stevens explained in a footnote that the law entailed three questions: if the 
requested modification is reasonable, if it is necessary for the person with a disability, and whether 
it constitutes a fundamental alteration. In logic, said the Court, there is no necessary order in which 
the questions must be answered, and, “In routine cases, the fundamental alteration inquiry may end 
with the question whether a rule is essential.” Id. at 683 n.38. Therefore, some cases might entail an 
investigation whether a modification is reasonable that is in some respects divorced from the 
fundamental alteration inquiry, but as soon as the modification is shown to be necessary for the 
plaintiff to obtain a benefit from the public accommodation, the inquiry is satisfied and the case 
moves on to consider fundamental alteration.  
 245. Id. at 682–83. 
 246. Id. at 683–86. The Court consulted the widely accepted Rules of Golf written by the 
United States Golf Association and the Royal and Ancient Golf Club of Scotland (as opposed to the 
specific rules adopted for the third round of the Q-School and most of its other tournaments by the 
PGA), and looked to the history of the game and the more recent history of the use of carts. Id. at 
683–85. 
 247. Id. at 686–88. 
 248. Id. at 690. 
 249. Id. at 700–01 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For Scalia, whether walking is a fundamental aspect 
of golf is an “incredibly difficult and incredibly silly” question that “[e]ither out of humility or out 
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on the outcome, particularly given that golf is primarily a game of skill.250 
The Court in Martin not only treated the reasonable modification duty 
(comparable to reasonable accommodation) and the fundamental alteration 
limit (comparable to undue hardship) as a single term, it also displayed a 
high level of skepticism about the value of standard operating procedure 
and uniform treatment of all persons subject to a set of rules. It opened 
itself to criticism for dictating what is and is not essential to someone 
else’s activity, which is very much what the statute requires a court to do, 
but what courts have proven themselves generally unwilling to do in 
employment cases under Title I of the ADA.251 
Non-employment related precedent under Title II of the ADA252 also 
reveals a liberal approach to that Title’s analogues to reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship, as well as the treatment of the 
concepts as two sides of the same coin. Regulations promulgated to 
enforce Title II require “reasonable modifications” in programs and 
activities conducted by state and local governments, and afford the 
governmental entities a defense if the modifications constitute 
“fundamental alterations” of services and programs.253 In Olmstead v. L.C., 
the Supreme Court considered the case of two women with mental 
disabilities who had lived for many years in state institutions, even though 
treatment professionals believed that they could be served in community-
based residential programs that would afford them more freedom and 
better opportunity for participation in community activities.254 The Court 
affirmed in part and vacated in part a ruling that the state violated Title II 
of the ADA by failing to place the women in the community. Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg’s opinion concluded that Title II, whose regulations 
provide that a “public entity shall administer services, programs, and 
                                                                                                                     
of self-respect (one or the other) the Court should decline to answer.” Id. at 700. 
 250. Id. at 701. Moreover, Scalia noted, the modification of the rule potentially favored only 
one player. Id. at 701–02. The other Supreme Court case on reasonable accommodation under Title 
III, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), also provoked a stinging dissent from Justice Scalia, 
but that case dealt primarily with whether a person with asymptomatic HIV infection was covered 
under the ADA, rather than what accommodations she should receive. 
 251. It is true, as Professor Waterstone points out, that the accommodation in Martin did not 
cost money. Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1852–53 (2005). But the fact that the PGA pursued the case to the 
Supreme Court is only one indication of how important the PGA felt the rule was to its operation. 
The PGA also enlisted celebrity golfers and other witnesses to develop an extensive testimonial 
record in the case. 
 252. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134 (2006). Title II contains simply a definitions section, a broad 
declaration that disability discrimination by state and local government agencies is illegal, a 
remedies provision, and a delegation to the Attorney General to promulgate regulations to 
implement that prohibition. 
 253. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2009) (“A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in 
policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on 
the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.”). 
 254. 527 U.S. 581, 593–94 (1999). 
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activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified 
individuals with disabilities[,]”255 supported the plaintiffs’ claim for a 
community placement.256  
Speaking for four members of the Court, Justice Ginsburg nevertheless 
cautioned that the state’s responsibility was “not boundless.”257 Citing the 
reasonable modifications-fundamental alterations language, she wrote that 
while the state must alter its placement practices, the regulation required 
consideration of state resource allocations concerns in light of the need to 
provide community placement to the all the people with mental disabilities 
for whom state was responsible and who desired it. The opinion pointed 
out that the state could not necessarily save money by closing institutions if 
some residents still needed or wanted institutional settings; community 
placements, if scarce, needed to be allocated fairly.258 But the opinion did 
require a comprehensive, effective working plan to place individuals in 
less restrictive settings and a waiting list that moved at not less than a 
reasonable pace,259 a rate not controlled by any effort to keep the 
institutions populated.260   
The Court thus imposed on the state a significant duty to accommodate 
persons with disabilities under the reasonable modification standard. As 
importantly, the plurality opinion also read “reasonable modifications” and 
“fundamental alteration” as the same term.261 It did not ask first whether 
the expansion of available community placements was reasonable in the 
run of cases and then whether on a more particularized showing, it would 
constitute a fundamental alteration under the facts of the case. Instead, the 
opinion spoke of “the fundamental-alteration component of the reasonable-
modifications regulation,” saying that it allowed “the State to show that, in 
the allocation of available resources, immediate relief for plaintiffs would 
be inequitable, given the responsibility the State has undertaken for the 
care and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons with mental 
disabilities.”262 The opinion went on to develop the limits on the 
                                                                                                                     
 255. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998). 
 256. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597–603.  
 257. Id. at 603 (plurality opinion). This part of the opinion had the votes of its author and 
Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer. Justice Stevens concurred in the result and joined the rest of 
the opinion but said that the issue was disposed of in earlier proceedings in the case and was not 
properly before the Court. Id. at 607 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Anthony Kennedy also 
concurred in the judgment. Id. at 608 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 258. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion). 
 259. The plurality equated a reasonable pace to “‘asking [a] person to wait a short time until a 
community bed is available.’” Id. at 606 (quoting oral argument of state’s attorney). 
 260. Id. at 605–06. 
 261. Justice Stevens’s vote would have made the opinion a majority, and it seems clear from 
his opinion in Martin that he would have embraced an approach similar to that of Justice Ginsburg 
on this issue; his endorsement of the lower court decision, which balanced the cost of 
accommodating the two plaintiffs against the entire relevant expenditures of the state, displayed an 
attitude even more favorably disposed to the plaintiffs’ position. See supra text accompanying notes 
239–51 (discussing Martin opinion). 
 262. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion). 
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community-placement modification that it believed were fundamental 
alterations, but it never discussed the pairing of reasonable modification 
and fundamental alteration as anything but two aspects of the same idea. 
Lower court cases under Titles II and III involving issues other than 
employment manifest a similar approach to Martin and Olmstead in 
interpreting the Titles’ reasonable accommodation and undue hardship 
analogues. In Title II cases, courts typically omit or give only the slightest 
attention to any reasonable modification determination and instead leap to 
considering fundamental alteration, thus taking the reasonable 
modification-fundamental alteration question as the same inquiry.263 Even 
some employment cases concerning the federal agency provisions of the 
Rehabilitation Act, whose accommodation language parallels that of the 
ADA, manifest a two-sides-of-the-same-coin approach.264 The 
interpretation of Titles II and III by the Supreme Court and the other courts 
in a manner that treats the concept of accommodation as a continuum from 
reasonable modification to fundamental alteration should be highly 
persuasive support for an interpretation of Title I that makes 
accommodation a continuum from reasonable accommodation to undue 
hardship. Even authorities wedded to textualism look to interpretations of 
the same or similar language in other parts of a statute or comparable 
statutes in interpreting terms of the statute in question.265 It is entirely apt 
to rely on these Title II and III decisions in future employment 
accommodations cases. 
2.  Looking to Interpretations in Other Jurisdictions 
As the precedent regarding Titles II and III indicates, reasonable 
accommodation and its analogues, and undue hardship and its analogues, 
                                                                                                                     
 263. E.g., Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(denying all motions for summary judgment in case concerning adequacy of integration of 
individuals with mental illness in adult home placements and treating reasonable modification and 
fundamental alteration as alternatives, stating, “The court will consider all of this evidence together 
in determining whether the requested relief would be a ‘reasonable modification’ or ‘fundamental 
alteration’ of Defendants’ programs and services.”); AP v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
11, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1141–42 & n.13 (D. Minn. 2008) (denying summary judgment on 
request for accommodations for child’s diabetes in public day care program, with limited exception 
as to damages claim, considering reasonable modification and fundamental alteration together and 
giving primary consideration to fundamental alteration defense).  
 264. See Arneson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90, 92 (8th Cir. 1991) (“‘An unreasonable 
accommodation is one which would impose undue hardship on the operation of its program.’”) 
(quoting Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 1989)); Meisser v. Hove, 872 F. Supp. 
507, 520 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (“Since defendant made some accommodation, the court views the issue 
of whether that accommodation was reasonable under the circumstances as analytically inseparable 
from the issue of whether additional accommodation could have been made without undue 
hardship.”); see also cases cited supra notes 54–60 (discussing pre-ADA Rehabilitation Act 
precedent). Federal agency employees are covered under section 504 rather than under Title I of the 
ADA. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2006). 
 265. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 
348 (2010). 
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need not be read as separate terms. Notably, Canadian law, like American 
law, requires reasonable accommodation266 and establishes an undue 
hardship defense,267 but the Canadian Supreme Court has declared that the 
reasonable accommodation duty and the undue hardship defense “are not 
independent criteria but are alternate ways of expressing the same 
concept.”268 Viewing the terms as part of the same concept, two sides of 
the same coin rather than independent criteria, has an impact on disability 
discrimination cases.269 For example, in contrast to Barnett’s treatment of 
seniority rights as all but untouchable, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
in Regina (City) v. Kivela required as a reasonable accommodation the 
award of retroactive competitive seniority credit for a truck driver with 
cerebral palsy whose disability kept him from performing extra manual 
labor assignments that permitted other workers to accrue greater credit 
toward seniority.270 Similarly, a Canadian labor tribunal required 
maintenance of full-time benefits for an employee whose disability 
permitted only part-time work, emphasizing that no undue hardship was 
proven. 271  
B.   A Significant Duty, Not a Cost-Benefit Test 
The ADA and its history, interpretations of analogous terms of the 
ADA, and the better-reasoned precedent all support the idea that the 
accommodation duty is strenuous, not subject to cost-benefit balancing, but 
subject to an increase of obligations as technology and expectations 
advance. Restoring the proper interpretation of the statute may be done 
                                                                                                                     
 266. Employment Equity Act, 1995 S.C., ch. 44 § 5(b) (Can.). 
 267. Id. § 6(a). These provisions are federal; provincial legislation is similar. See, e.g., Human 
Rights Code of Manitoba, 1987–88 S.M., ch. 45 § 9(1) (Can.). 
 268. Cent. Okanagan Sch. Dist. No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 ¶ 26 (Can.) (religious 
accommodation case). 
 269. This point may seem obvious from the discussion of Vande Zande and other cases that 
throw out accommodation claims without ever reaching hardship or where the showing of hardship 
is nonexistent or weak, see supra text accompanying notes 169–72, 175–83 (discussing cases not 
reaching undue hardship), but the contrast with results in jurisdictions that use the two-sides-of-the-
coin approach remains instructive. 
 270. [2006] 275 Sask. R. 271, ¶¶ 3, 5, 8, 80 (Sask. Ct. App.) (Can.). 
 271. Ins. Corp. of B.C. v. O.P.E.I.U. Loc. 378, [2003] 123 L.A.C. (4th) 422 ¶ 48 (B.C. 
Arbitration Bd.) (Can.); see id. at ¶ 27 (discussing undue hardship); see also O.S.S.T.F., Dist. 10 v. 
Peel (County) Bd. of Educ., [1999] 73 L.A.C. (4th) 183, ¶¶ 1, 88 (Ontario Arbitration Bd.) (Can.) 
(requiring that teacher with multiple sclerosis working two-thirds of normal school day and 
applying sick leave for remainder of day receive income and pension benefits of full-time teacher). 
In general, Canadian decisions impose a strong accommodation duty on employers, see Michael 
Lynk, Disability and Work: The Transformation of the Legal Status of Employees with Disabilities 
in Canada, in THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA SPECIAL LECTURES 2007: EMPLOYMENT LAW 
189, 190 (Randall Scott Echlin & Chris G. Paliare eds., 2007) (collecting and analyzing Canadian 
cases on reasonable accommodation), though accommodations appear to be more plentiful in the 
unionized sector than in non-unionized employment, see Ravi Malhotra, A Tale of Marginalization: 
Comparing Workers with Disabilities in Canada and the United States, 22 J.L. &  SOC. POL’Y 79, 
101–02 (2009).  
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most effectively by encouraging courts to step back and let juries make 
accommodations determinations. 
1.  Looking to the Statute and Its History 
Accommodations such as aides for blind teachers, readers for blind or 
deaf caseworkers, or personal attendants for work and work-related travel 
all cost money and all might fail a cost-benefit balance. Yet these are 
accommodations the legislative history specifies. And their imposition is 
consistent with the language of the statute, which rejects only “significant 
difficulty or expense” when considered in light of factors such as the 
overall financial resources of the employer.272 
2.  Looking to Interpretations of Analogous Terms in the ADA 
Professor Michael Waterstone has documented that results in cases 
brought under Titles II and III are much more favorable to claimants than 
in cases under Title I, and he concludes, “[C]ourts are not as troubled by 
the accommodation mandate in the Title II and III contexts.”273 
Examination of individual Title II opinions confirms the liberality of the 
courts’ approaches to reasonable modifications as well.274 As noted, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions on Titles II and III impose significant unwanted 
burdens on the defendants.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 272. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A), (B) (2006). 
 273. Waterstone, supra note 251, at 1849 (contending that either this is true or courts are 
finding other ways to reach pro-plaintiff results and finding reasons to believe former is correct); 
see also id. at 1828–29 (with regard to study of Title II and III appellate cases available on 
Westlaw, finding in Title II cases that defendants obtain full reversal in 34% of cases and plaintiffs 
obtain reversal in 24% of cases and in Title III cases that defendants obtain full reversal in 50% of 
cases and plaintiffs obtain reversal in 24% of cases, compared with study of Title I appellate cases 
showing that defendants obtain reversal in 42% of cases and reduction in damages in 17.5% of 
cases, while plaintiffs obtain full reversal in 12% of cases; further reporting pro-plaintiff results at 
trial in 23% of Title II cases and 20% of Title III cases in pool of appealed cases contrasted with 
study showing 6% of pro-plaintiff trial results in Title I cases in similar pool); see also id. at 1853 
(“My research shows very few Title III cases have been decided against plaintiffs at the appellate 
level because the requested accommodation was too expensive.”); cf. Ruth Colker, Winning and 
Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 240 (2001) (reporting 
success rate for defendants in 93% of Title I cases at trial level and 84% in cases reaching courts of 
appeals). 
274. See Waterstone, supra note 251, at 1845–48 (collecting cases involving public benefits, 
voting, and removal of architectural barriers). The analogous accommodations provision of the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (West 2006), forbidding disability discrimination by federal 
government in its activities and programs has also been read expansively. See, e g., Am. Council of 
the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1267–74 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that modifications to paper 
currency to permit blind persons to distinguish denominations met test of reasonableness if that test 
were applied, that absence of tactile or other features denied meaningful access to currency, and that 
Treasury Department failed to show undue burden). 
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3.  Looking to (Selected) Precedent 
As noted above, many federal courts, particularly courts of appeals, 
have permitted finders of fact to determine that quite onerous 
accommodations are required under the reasonable accommodation-undue 
hardship test.275 Some state court cases interpreting analogous state law 
provisions also impose stringent duties. In McDonald v. Department of 
Environmental Quality,276 the Montana Supreme Court took a position 
quite different from that in cases such as Vande Zande, which hold that a 
cost-benefit analysis must be applied to accommodations and that requests 
will be viewed harshly. McDonald overturned the dismissal of a state law 
reasonable accommodation claim asserted by an employee with mental and 
other impairments who had already been permitted to use a service dog to 
help her keep her balance while walking and to keep her alert while at her 
desk, but whose dog could not navigate tiled floor surfaces without 
slipping and occasionally falling and injuring itself.277 The court ruled that 
installing carpet runners or another non-slip floor surface in the building to 
permit use of the dog could constitute a reasonable accommodation.278 
Other state courts applying state statutory duties of reasonable 
accommodation have also found triable issues of fact on accommodations 
many federal courts would likely find too unusual or expensive. For 
example, a California court required a trial over the reasonableness of the 
employer’s furnishing a motorized scooter to a production supervisor with 
a hammertoe condition so he could more easily move around the factory 
floor.279 
 4.  Looking to the Jury 
A serious challenge to plaintiffs making accommodations claims is the 
reluctance of federal district courts to defer to jury decisions and a 
reluctance—though perhaps not quite as great—on the part of courts of 
appeals to force them to do so. In the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court 
signaled to lower federal courts that they had more freedom to use 
summary judgment than previously exercised.280 In ADA cases, courts 
                                                                                                                     
 275. District court opinions denying accommodations may be an unrepresentative sample 
given that a district court is more likely to write an opinion when granting a defendant’s summary 
judgment motion, a decision that is dispositive, than denial of the motion, which is interlocutory. 
Cf. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 99, 104 (1999) (“[A] decision to grant summary judgment is more likely to result in a 
written opinion than a decision to dismiss or enter a verdict . . . .”). 
 276. 214 P.3d 749 (Mont. 2009). 
 277. Id. at 751–52, 764. 
 278. Id. at 764. Montana law is similar to the ADA with regard to reasonable accommodation 
and undue hardship. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(19)(b) (2010). 
 279. Ayzenshteyn v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., No. B196458, 2009 WL 27188, at *1, *7 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2009) (noncitable). The California Fair Housing and Employment Act’s language 
on reasonable accommodation and undue hardship matches that of the ADA. See C L. GOV. CODE 
§ 12940(m) (West 2010).  
 280. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“We think that the position taken 
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have taken this authority and run with it. The frequent use of summary 
judgment in cases having to do with reasonable accommodation has led to 
fewer decisions in which juries, drawing on common experience, have the 
opportunity to draw conclusions about reasonability different from those of 
judges inclined to sympathize with employers.281 Sometimes, the courts’ 
use of language is revealing. For example, in Filar v. Board of Education, 
a substitute teacher with osteoarthritis who could not drive or walk long 
distances and thus needed assignment to a school close to public 
transportation, asked for a variance from the school board’s roving 
substitute assignment system.282 The court of appeals affirmed a grant of 
summary judgment against the teacher.283 It commented, “[T]he question is 
whether her requested accommodation was reasonable, and we don’t think 
it was.”284 The court conceded that the claim had “surface appeal” but said 
that “aspects of the request convince us that it was just not reasonable.”285 
The court asserted that even if working around the existing collective 
bargaining agreement were possible, there would remain the administrative 
                                                                                                                     
by the majority of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with the standard for summary judgment set 
forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . In our view, the plain language of 
Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon 
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial.”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252–56 (1986) (suggesting greater 
availability of summary judgment in public-figure defamation case); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595–98 (1986) (upholding entry of summary judgment in factual 
context of antitrust case).  
 281. Colker, supra note 275, at 101 (“My review of the litigation outcome data—combined 
with my individualized review of every appellate decision and many of the district court cases 
decided since the ADA became effective in 1992—leads to the conclusion that district and appellate 
courts are deploying two strategies that result in markedly pro-defendant outcomes under the ADA. 
Courts are abusing the summary judgment device and failing to defer to agency guidance in 
interpreting the ADA.”); see also Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA 
Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 326–29 (2008) (discussing role of judicial attitudes in accounting for 
low win rates in ADA employment litigation). Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges 
and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They 
Fare Better Before a Jury? A Response to Professor Colker, 19 REV. LITIG. 505, 510 (2000) 
(collecting and analyzing data from “jury research in connection with actual litigation, [that] reveals 
a general public that is much more enlightened on issues of disability and workplace 
accommodation than are many employers—and is thus much less likely to produce pro-defense 
outcomes than current dispositive motion practice,” but attributing failure to reach juries to poor 
advocacy in litigated cases). These authors attribute the failure to reach juries to poor advocacy, but 
lawyers often have little to work with when struggling against ingrained attitudes of district courts. 
While courts of appeals say they apply a de novo standard in reviewing grants of summary 
judgment, see, e.g., Bellino v. Peters, 530 F.3d 543, 548 (7th Cir. 2008), too often they defer to 
lower courts’ reasonability determinations, see Stein, supra note 70, at 93. 
 282. 526 F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 283. Id. at 1068. 
 284. Id. at 1067 (emphasis added). 
 285. Id. (emphasis added). The court said that one of the convincing aspects was that the 
accommodation “would have amounted to preferential treatment, which the ADA does not require.” 
Id. 
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burden of researching schools in the city that would satisfy the teacher’s 
restrictions.286 The court never asked whether a reasonable jury might have 
come to a different conclusion after hearing the evidence.287 
It will not be easy to wean lower court judges from deciding 
accommodations cases on the basis of their own gut reactions. Litigants 
will need to appeal to the judges’ professionalism and restraint and remind 
the courts of what Congress intended in 1990 and what courts have 
required in analogous contexts. A lay jury is in so many respects a better 
decider of whether accommodations are reasonable or whether they impose 
undue hardship.288 Twelve members of the community will collectively be 
much more familiar with the modern workplace than a judge whose non-
legal work experience may have come decades earlier. Many jurors will be 
far more aware of modern technology and its potential than judges will. 
Moreover, since jurors are not bound by determinations about what was 
not required in a previous case, they can approach the case before them 
with a more dynamic view, a view in all respects closer to that envisioned 
by the framers of the ADA.  
C.  Preferences, Neutral Policies, and “Affirmative Action” 
Judicial errors about the ADA’s supposed failure to enact preferences 
and preservation of neutral policies may be challenged by attention to the 
statute and its history, its interpretation in Barnett, and the interpretation of 
comparable provisions in other jurisdictions. The comparison to 
“affirmative action” is wrong and should be abandoned. 
1.  Looking to the Statute and Its History 
As noted above, the statute in its text, history, and regulatory agency 
interpretation, requires preferences for workers with disabilities. These 
preferences are in the form of accommodations—variances from otherwise 
neutral rules. The preferences are part of treating someone differently in 
                                                                                                                     
 286. Id. at 1068. 
 287. A matter of some concern is that the greater license afforded district courts to dismiss 
cases at the pleadings stage under B ll Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007), and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), may exacerbate this condition. See Joseph A. 
Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95 (2010) (expressing concern that Twombly may lead 
to more frequent dismissals of ADA cases). Given the presence of an EEOC charge in an ADA Title 
I case, it seems doubtful that the employer needs the federal court complaint to be on notice of what 
the case is about. The dismissals on the pleadings thus seem more significant for the judge’s 
underlying message: “In my opinion, this is a weak claim. Go away.” See Torres v. Am. Auto. Parts, 
No. 07 C 3702, 2008 WL 2622835, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2008) (noting contents of EEOC 
charge and right to sue letter filling out information about case, but nevertheless dismissing case 
brought pro se concerning alleged failure to accommodate by making plaintiff stand while doing 
work). 
 288. Professor Sunstein, it should be noted, is skeptical of the use of juries in accommodations 
cases. See Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1905–06. Much of his concern, however, stems from doubts 
about juries’ ability to make cost-benefit analyses, something they should not be doing under a 
proper reading of the statute. 
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order to treat the person fairly.289 If departure from an otherwise neutral 
rule is sought, the statute and its contextual materials are the first line of 
support. 
2.  Looking to Barnett 
The second line is Barnett. The Court could not have made it clearer 
that the ADA’s accommodations provision requires preferences: “The Act 
requires preferences in the form of ‘reasonable accommodations’ that are 
needed for those with disabilities to obtain the same workplace 
opportunities that those without disabilities automatically enjoy.”290 That 
Justice Scalia would dissent on this issue is unremarkable; obviously, some 
courts and other authorities took this position before Barnett came 
down.291 What is more surprising, however, is that so many courts have 
failed to realize that the majority of the Supreme Court rejected this 
reasoning. Courts continue to follow Humiston-Keeling; Aka and similar 
cases feel more like the exception as courts continue to assert that the ADA 
does not require “preferences” for employees with disabilities or departure 
                                                                                                                     
 289. The unadorned use of the term “preference” may be criticized on the ground that what is a 
preference from one perspective, that of the person without a disability, is simply equal treatment 
from the perspective of the person with a disability. See Anita Silvers, Protection or Privilege? 
Reasonable Accommodation, Reverse Discrimination, and the Fair Costs of Repairing Recognition 
for Disabled People in the Workforce, 8 J. GENDER RACE &  JUST. 561, 571 (2005) (“The ADA 
proposes to alter social practice so as not to exclude individuals with the kinds of biological 
differences that people have come to label ‘disabilities.’ But, in Barnett and other ADA cases, the 
Court has stigmatized the recognition that policies for accommodating their differences afford the 
disabled by characterizing such accommodations as preferential.”); see also Burgdorf, supra note 
73, at 298 (“[Barnett’s] designation of reasonable accommodation as ‘special’ and 
‘preferential,’ . . . is inartful, misguided, and damaging. It fosters the misconception that the ADA 
gives people with disabilities some type of advantage over people without disabilities.”). 
Nevertheless, the subtlety of that point would likely have been lost on lower courts, who have had 
trouble enough even requiring any departures from seemingly neutral rules. 
 290. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (emphasis omitted); se  also id. 
(“By definition any special ‘accommodation’ requires the employer to treat an employee with a 
disability differently, i.e., preferentially.”). Many commentators have pressed this point. E.g.,
Elizabeth A. Pendo, Substantially Limited Justice?: The Possibilities and Limits of a New Rawlsian 
Analysis of Disability-Based Discrimination, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 225, 255 (2003) (“By definition 
a special ‘accommodation’ requires the employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, 
i.e., preferentially. And the fact that the difference in treatment violates an employer’s 
disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation beyond the Act’s potential reach.”). 
The Supreme Court foreshadowed its conclusion that reasonable accommodation entails preferences 
when it held that a state could act rationally in the constitutional sense if as an employer it denied 
accommodations in order to continue to use existing inaccessible facilities. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. 
of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001). 
 291. The position bears a similarity to that in Gary Lawson, AIDS, Astrology, and Arline: 
Towards a Causal Interpretation of Section 504, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 237, 249 (1989) (proposing 
reading of section 504 of Rehabilitation Act to cover only instances in which claimant’s disability 
medically causes a limit on specific physical activity). For a response to Professor Lawson, see 
Weber, supra note 238, at 1112 n.130. 
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from neutral rules.292  
3.  Looking to Interpretations in Other Jurisdictions 
When federal courts ignore the clear implications of a Supreme Court 
decision, it may be quixotic to expect them to follow state court cases. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that many state decisions interpreting 
statutes similar to the ADA reject the position that neutral employment 
practices, such as filling all positions with the person most qualified, 
provide a justification not to afford a reasonable accommodation, such as 
preferential transfer of employees with disabilities who cannot do their 
jobs to vacant positions they can perform. In a case under the California 
Fair Employment and Housing Act, the court reversed a grant of summary 
judgment to a bank that had failed to offer a job reassignment of a full-time 
position to an employee who, after being the victim of a bank robbery, 
suffered post-traumatic stress disorder and could no longer work with the 
public or with money.293 Noting that the bank had not “definitively” 
established that it had no vacant positions the employee could fill,294 the 
court rejected the claim that an employee with a disability is entitled to no 
more than the right to compete for open slots: “[T]o the extent Wells Fargo 
rejected Jensen for positions for which she was qualified because it had 
applicants who were more qualified or had seniority, it overlooks that 
when reassignment of an existing employee is the issue, the disabled 
employee is entitled to preferential consideration.”295  
4.  Banishing the Ghost of “Affirmative Action” 
Acknowledging that the ADA enacts a form of preference by requiring 
accommodation does not, of course, say anything at all about affirmative 
action, and the two terms should not be confused. As Professor Carlos Ball 
notes, reasonable accommodation requires an individualized assessment of 
specific individuals, whereas affirmative action is a class-based approach; 
moreover, affirmative action is a remedy, not a right, whereas failure to 
provide accommodations is defined as a form of discrimination itself.296 
                                                                                                                     
 292. See, e.g., Filar v. Bd. of Educ., 526 F.3d 1054, 1067 (7th Cir. 2008) (asserting that ADA 
does not require preferences for employees with disabilities). Professor Anderson points out that 
Title VII thinking may lie at the root of these interpretations. See Anderson, supra note 36, at 15 
(“Courts likely place so much emphasis on the characterization of the employer’s policy as 
‘legitimate’ and ‘non-discriminatory’ because they cannot get beyond thinking about the ADA in 
traditional Title VII terms.”). 
 293. Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 57–58, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 294. Id. at 68. 
 295. Id. at 69. 
 296. Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 973–81& nn.133–61 (2004) (collecting and 
analyzing authorities); see also Ravi Malhotra, The Implications of the Social Model of 
Disablement for the Legal Regulation of the Modern Workplace in Canada and the United States, 
33 MANITOBA L.J. 1, 32 (2009) (“It cannot be said that Mr. Barnett argued that he ought to receive a 
preference in interpreting seniority rights because of a history of systemic discrimination against 
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Thus, affirmative action and reasonable accommodation may both entail 
preferences, but affirmative action and reasonable accommodation are 
different in both character and operation.297 This all should have been clear 
since Alexander v. Choate298 twenty-five years ago, but courts seem 
strangely drawn to the erroneous understanding. 
CONCLUSION 
The core of the ADA is the accommodation obligation, and the next 
few years will show whether courts will prove true to the ADA as 
Congress enacted it. To be true to the statute, courts need to return to its 
text, its history, and its authoritative interpretations. If they do so, they will 
apply an obligation to accommodate up to a limit of due hardship, and not 
separate out reasonableness from what is undue. They will impose a 
substantial, dynamic obligation using a cost-resources balance and will 
defer appropriately to jury decisions. And they will not shy away from 
requiring preferential treatment when an accommodation does not entail an 
undue hardship. Doing so is no more than obeying Congress’s command.  
                                                                                                                     
people with disabilities. Rather, the request for exemption from the seniority system was based on 
an individualized assessment of how his particular impairment affected his ability to perform the 
essential functions of his job in a specific workplace.”). 
 297. See Ball, supra note 296, at 966–70 (characterizing reasonable accommodation and 
affirmative action as two different kinds of preferential treatment); see also Stephen F. Befort & 
Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Reasonable 
Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. &  LEE L. REV. 1045, 1082–86 (2000) 
(noting equal-but-different treatment foundation of reasonable accommodation and contrast with 
remedial measures such as affirmative action); Malhotra, supra note 296, at 32 (“[A] failure to 
provide reasonable accommodation under the ADA in itself constitutes discrimination against 
people with disabilities provided that it does not impose an undue hardship on the employer. In 
contrast, under Title VII, affirmative action is merely a remedy when discrimination has already 
been demonstrated to have occurred in the past.”). 
 298. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
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